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ABSTRACT 
 
Direct finance such as stock and bond markets has provided an alternative 
source of funds for a large number of firms, which depends heavily on bank 
loans for credit previously. Bank loans are more expensive indeed than direct 
finance so that only those borrowers cannot access to capital markets turn to it. 
Such co-existence of alternative sources of finance has supplied prevalent 
issues for researches. The thesis focuses on investment choice and the 
selection of occupation with finance restriction under co-existence of finance 
sources. We also investigate the impact of inequality in imperfect markets.  
 
In Chapter 2 we develop a model in which agents differ according to their 
endowments of working capital. They can borrow their money to the capital 
market to earn interest, or invest in a CRS technology, which is an abbreviation 
of Constant Return to Scale. The return of CRS is a linear increasing function 
corresponding to its input. Hence it is a completely riskless investment. 
Individuals also can undertake a risky project which has a fixed set-up cost. On 
account of finance constraint, they make their investment and occupation 
choice. Because of imperfection in the market, lenders cannot obtain 
information about the real return of the risky project from borrowers, there is 
credit ration and many entrepreneurs invest at a sub-optimal status. We then 
introduce a monitoring technology to make it possible for external lenders to 
observe the return of the private project. Thus lenders who have the 
monitoring technology can supply any amount of money to borrowers and 
individuals have an alternative source to raise money. Our result shows the 
monitoring technology improve the economy. Part of poor individuals who are 
pure lenders in the previous situation can afford the set-up cost of the risky 
project. Meanwhile part of sub-optimally investment entrepreneur reach to a 
optimal status. 
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Chapter 3 is an empirical test which is derived straightforwardly from the 
comparative statics results of Chapter 2. The comparative statics show that 
there are threshold effects of the model on income difference between the rich 
and the poor. In other words, if income difference is lower than a critical value, 
then the minimal investment level and the interest rate positively related to the 
mean wealth. Otherwise both of them negatively linked to the mean value. 
Comparing to the previous theoretical model, a significant improvement of the 
empirical model is that we substitute income inequality for income difference. 
In this chapter we discuss how the average wealth affects financial 
development over the different values of income inequality. We found both 
initial wealth and its distribution work together to determine the interest rate, 
the minimal investment level and consequently the size of the capital market. 
The empirical tests observe two important results. One is that a rise of average 
income does improve financial development as long as the income inequality 
is below a cut-off value. The other is that there is a strong threshold effect on 
income inequality.  
 
Chapter 4 modify the model of Chapter 2 from a continuous investment model 
to a fixed one while it introduce a labour market to analyze the markets 
equilibrium from both physical and human capital sides. We present a static 
model of an economy where individuals are heterogeneous in terms of initial 
wealth and there are credit constraints. Individuals are endowed with time 
resource which they can allocate between working and leisure to maximize 
their utility. What¶s more, individuals can choose to either sell their labour in the 
labour market or self-employ. Put differently, depending on the opportunity 
costs of alternatives, they can supply as pure wage workers or become 
entrepreneurs by running a risky project. Workers receive fixed wages while 
entrepreneurs receive risky profits. Individuals make their decisions on either 
to be wage workers or entrepreneurs by comparing the utility from the wage 
6 
 
work with that from the risky project. The endogenous interest rate adjusts to 
the point where the supply of credits is equal to the demand for funds while the 
wage rate meets the labour market clearing condition. We find that an increase 
in the mean wealth leads to a decrease in the interest rate. In equilibrium, the 
wage rate rises and so does the labour time. Meanwhile, both the optimal 
amount of labour and the minimal requirement of labour of the project 
decrease. Chapter 5 is a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Researches on corporate finance had made tremendous progress over the 
past twenty years. There are a lot of substantial work providing a clear pattern 
of capital markets, financial structure, governance and their impacts on 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ behavior and ILUPV¶ activities. However, most of researches 
presume perfect market conditions such as convex preferences, perfect 
competition and symmetric information.. In fact, imperfect market and 
asymmetric information dominate the real world. Individuals come from 
different sides possessing specific private information. It is the main source of 
market imperfection in our model. For example, lenders usually do not know 
borrowers' exact returns of the project without paying considerable monitoring 
costs. Consequently, lenders may offer funds to high-quality borrowers rather 
than low-quality borrowers. Individuals¶ wealth is one of the criteria to 
distinguish the low quality borrowers from those of high quality. Hence credit 
rationing divides individuals into different groups such that some of them 
obtain credits while the others not. An interesting question is how initial wealth 
and the distribution of wealth affect individuals' activities in the imperfect 
markets. The essay is revolving around this issue all the time. 
 
In Chapter 2 we discuss imperfection in the capital market from investment 
point of view. Agents are distinguished by their initial wealth. They have three 
different investment methods. Firstly, they may lend money to others who need 
credit. It is equivalent to put their money to the capital market and they earn the 
interest. Secondly, they may have a CRS technology with constant returns. 
Finally, they may carry out a risky project with a fixed set-up cost. We find that 
the poorest individuals are pure lenders. Those low to medium wealth 
individuals borrow money which is equal to the liquidated value of the project 
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to achieve a sub-optimal project. Individuals with medium to high wealth raise 
necessary credit to achieve an optimal project. Meanwhile, the richest 
individuals self-finance. Then we expand the model by introducing a 
monitoring technology to observe the real returns of the private project. We call 
the intermediary with such a monitoring technology as the bank. Since bank 
has exhaustive information about the private project, it is willing to lend any 
amount of money to entrepreneurs. Then there are two different ways to raise 
money in the market. Entrepreneurs may collect credit either from the capital 
market or the loan market. Apparently, bank loan is more expensive than its 
alternative since the monitoring cost. But some very poor individuals still 
benefit from it because they obtain a chance to raise enough money to 
undertake the risky project while they have to be pure lenders without bank 
loan. Our result shows that the poorest individuals are still pure lenders. But 
some relatively poor individuals now are entrepreneurs by obtaining bank 
loans to invest optimally. On the other hands, part of low to medium wealth 
agents prefer to borrow from the capital market because of the lower cost, they 
invest sub-optimally. Other low to medium wealth individuals choose bank 
loans and invest optimally. Those medium to high wealth individuals raise 
enough funds from the capital market to achieve an optimal investment. Those 
richest individuals still self-finance. While most researches focus on a fixed 
investment model, the innovation of our model is to analyse the issue of 
investment and occupation choice in the circumstance of a continue 
investment model. We also carry out a comparative statics analysis to reveal 
the relationship between the investment level, the interest rate and the 
average wealth. 
 
The result of comparative statics shows there are an explicit threshold effect 
on the income difference between the rich and the poor. If the income 
difference is below the threshold then the minimal investment level and the 
interest rate positively related to the average wealth. Otherwise both of them 
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are negatively linked to the average wealth. As we all known, income 
difference is associated with income inequality indeed. The minimal 
investment level and the interest rate also determine the size of financial 
sectors. Hence the result of comparative statics may predict the relationships 
between financial development, average income and income inequality. We 
examine such relationship by carrying out an empirical test. A significant 
difference between the empirical model and the theoretical one is that we 
present income inequality as the Gini coefficient. The empirical tests apply to a 
panel of 16 countries for the period 1989-2004. We find overwhelming 
evidence of the threshold effect. The point estimates of the two Gini thresholds 
are 36.6 and 37.663, respectively. It means a rise of average income would 
improves financial development if the Gini coefficient is lower than 37.663. As 
long as the coefficient is higher than this value, financial development is 
negatively linked to average income. Normally, empirical researches on this 
area have to detect the threshold value by specifying an estimated equation 
and the form of the equation significantly affect the empirical result. Our 
contribution is to use the threshold regression which automatically detects any 
possible threshold to avoid the problem. 
 
In chapterChapter 4, we expand the model of Chapter 2 by introducing a 
labour market so that the risky project needs not only physical capital but also 
human capital. Unlike the continuous investment model in chapterChapter 2, 
here the risky project need a fixed physical investment while the human capital 
investment is continuous. Individual are heterogeneous in terms of initial 
wealth and there are credit constraints due to asymmetric information. 
Individuals are also endowed with time resource which they can allocate 
between working and leisure to maximize their utility. What¶s more, individuals 
can choose to either sell their labour in the labour market or self-employ. Put 
differently, they can supply as pure wage workers or become entrepreneurs by 
undertaking a risky project. Workers receive fixed wages while entrepreneurs 
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receive risky profits. Individuals make their decisions on whether to be wage 
workers or entrepreneurs by comparing the utility from the wage work with that 
from the risky project. The endogenous interest rate adjusts to the point where 
the supply of credits is equal to the demand for funds, while the wage rate 
meets the labour market clearing condition. We explore the simultaneous 
equation at different situations and one of the comparative statics results. Our 
contribution is to analyse the investment choice and occupation selection 
when the capital market and the labour market coexist. Meanwhile most 
researches only focus on single market circumstance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS, UNDERINVESTMENT  
AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN BANK AND MARKET FINANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate investment and occupation choice in an imperfect financial 
market. Here agents differ according to their initial endowments. Individuals 
choose to invest either the capital market, the CRS technology with constant 
returns or a risky project which has a fixed set-up cost. The result is the 
poorest individuals have to be pure lenders. Those low to medium wealth 
individuals borrow money which is just equal to the liquidated value of the 
project and invest sub-optimally. Those medium to high wealth individuals can 
borrow sufficient funds to invest optimally. The richest individuals self-finance. 
Then we introduce a monitoring technology to make it possible for external 
lenders to observe the return of the private project. Thus individuals have an 
alternative credit source which is called bank loan to raise money. Our result 
shows that the poorest individuals are still pure lenders. But some relatively 
poor individuals may undertake the risky project optimally by obtaining bank 
loans. On the other hands, part of low to medium wealth agents prefer to the 
capital market because of the lower cost of direct finance, they invest 
sub-optimally. Meanwhile, other low to medium wealth individuals choose bank 
loans and invest optimally. Medium to high wealth individuals raise enough 
funds from the capital market to achieve an optimal investment. Those richest 
individuals still self-finance. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Research on corporate finance has made tremendous progress over the past 
twenty years. There are substantial work on capital markets, financial structure, 
and their impacts on LQGLYLGXDOV¶ behavior and ILUPV¶ activities. Most of them, 
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for instance, the well-known Arrow-Debreu model and the Modigliani-Miller 
model, presume prefect market conditions so that no one suffers from 
imperfection problem such as asymmetric information in the market. However, 
the issue like asymmetric information is presented under most circumstance in 
the real world. For example, lenders usually do not know borrowers¶ exact 
returns of the project. Consequently, lenders may offer funds to high-quality 
borrowers rather than low-quality borrowers. Individuals¶ wealth may be one of 
criteria to distinguish low quality from high quality. Credit rationing thus divides 
individuals into different groups in that some of them obtain credits while the 
others not (Bester and Hellwig (1987)). A costly monitoring technology is 
introduced to prevent asymmetric information problem. It is an external control 
mechanism that gets rid of private benefit of borrowers and consequently 
ameliorates the problem. The situation is equivalent to the Costly State 
Verification framework which were original studied by Townsend (1979). Gale 
and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987)state that the verification 
problem also leads to credit rationing. Generally banks have such monitoring 
technology. However, monitoring is obviously expensive because of its cost. 
So only those borrowers who cannot access direct finance turn to bank loans. 
There are hence two different finance sources for firms. One is direct finance 
such as stocks and bonds. The other is bank loans which monitor ERUURZHUV¶ 
information. The problem is why some borrowers can access the capital 
market while others cannot? What does the role of initial wealth play in this 
case? How the aggregate wealth impacts investment and interest rate? We will 
explore these issues in the following sections.  
 
We investigate the imperfection on financial market for investment. Individuals 
differ according to their endowments of working capital. They make investment 
decisions among the capital market, the CRS technology with constant returns 
and a risky project which has a fixed set-up cost. We then introduce a 
monitoring technology to make it possible for external lenders to observe the 
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returns of the private project. We will discuss the market equilibrium conditions 
with and without banks under different situations. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
Entrepreneurs with limited endowments seek external funds in order to 
undertake risky projects. However, external financing reduces their expected 
returns by sharing of profits. Under conditions of imperfect markets, lenders 
cannot observe the realized returns of projects without paying considerable 
monitoring costs because of asymmetric information. Therefore entrepreneurs 
have a strong incentive to conceal their real returns from the project. Instead, 
they may claim the returns that are just equal to the liquidated value of the 
project. Lenders thus have to differentiate low-quality agents from high quality 
according some features of agents, such as initial wealth. In other words, there 
is credit ration in the system. 
 
Monitoring technology, which is equivalent to the Costly State Verification 
framework, is discussed by Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and 
Williamson (1986, 1987). It is introduced to alleviate the information 
asymmetry problem. Repullo and Suarez (2000) interpret that monitoring is an 
external control mechanism deterring entrepreneurs from diverting project¶ 
resources toward private benefits. Williamson (1986) points out that there is a 
duplication of effort over direct lending when intermediation is prohibited. For 
instance, suppose lenders monitor only in the event of default and each 
borrower collects credits from several lenders, then all the lenders monitor in 
the case of default. Financial intermediaries such as banks thus endogenously 
emerge. They borrow from a large number of lenders and lend to a large 
number of borrowers to eliminate this duplication. The idea of monitoring is 
very similar to Diamond (1984) who states that financial intermediaries play a 
µdelegated monitoring¶ role. The significant difference between them is that 
Williamson (1986) concludes that an equilibrium may exhibit credit rationing 
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such that presuming borrowers being identical ex ante, some receive loans 
and others do not. In contrast, credit rationing is not a feature of the equilibrium 
in Diamond (1984)¶s model. Furthermore, intermediaries in Diamond (1984) 
are single agents, while Williamson (1986) allows individuals to choose 
activities given their endowments and preferences. Boyd and Prescott (1985) 
discuss the issue under similar conditions except that intermediaries consist of 
multi-agent coalitions. Keeton (1979) provides the empirical support for the 
existence of credit rationing. It is necessary to point out that financial 
intermediaries are not always endogenously presented in these models. For 
example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) takes the idea of µbank¶ mainly by 
assumption. Our model regards banks as an existing monitoring technology 
and adopts a similar method of Williamson (1986). 
 
Besides CVS(the Costly State Verification framework), our model allows 
capital markets coexist with banks so that agents can choose to raise money 
from either capital markets or banks. A number of papers develop the issue of 
imperfection in these circumstances. Bolton and Freixas (2000) discuss a 
co-existence situation that both direct finance and financial intermediaries 
present simultaneously. They show that in equilibrium the riskier firms, who are 
equivalent to the poorest individuals in our model, prefer bank loans; the safer 
ones propose to borrow from the capital market; and the ones in between 
prefer to collect money from both. The result is consistent with Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). Repullo and Suarez (2000) explore the issue from the net worth 
point of view. In their equilibrium, the set of firms can be divided into three 
groups according to the value of net worth ratios. In particular, firms with small 
net worth try in vain, firms with medium net worth raise money by bank loans, 
and firms with large net worth prefer to collect funds from the capital market. 
Seward (1990) and Diamond (1991) provide assumptions different from 
Besanko and Kanatas (1993) such that banks can observe the return of project 
by monitoring, while external lenders do not, though all of them allow capital 
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markets and banks coexist. Seward (1990) permits entrepreneurs to use bank 
and capital markets simultaneously, but Diamond (1991) assumes borrowers 
rely on either banks or the capital market. Our model also allows co-existence 
of the capital market and banks. However, our model differs from Bolton and 
Freixas (2000) because we only permit individual choose one source subject 
to their one-off liquidation value, just like Diamond's model. 
 
We consider a model derived from that of Bougheas (2007), except that we 
discuss a continuous investment model rather than a fixed investment model. 
Bougheas depicts a situation in which project returns drop dramatically beyond 
a certain level. In contrast, our model assumes the risky project has increasing 
returns to scale. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) do a similar research. They 
study an incentive model of financial intermediation in which firms and 
intermediaries are capital constrained. They examine the reductions in 
different types of capital impact on investment, interest rates, and the forms of 
financing. Our model differs from theirs in several respects. Firstly, the frictions 
in their model are due to moral hazard rather than CVS. The moral hazard 
problem related to unobservability of effort. In our model, ex post informational 
asymmetry about project returns brings about credit ration. We then introduce 
a monitoring technology to make lenders observing project's returns. Secondly, 
they consider either a fixed size investment or a variable but without a fixed 
cost. In other words, the optimal investment is infinite in their set up. However, 
we assume that the product function is a concave curve in order to make 
investment finite. In particular, the sign of the first order derivative of the 
production function is negative while the sign of the second order is positive so 
that the marginal returns of the project will meet the marginal investment. It 
implies that there is an optimal investment level for the project. Meanwhile, the 
returns from CRS technology are constant. Individuals can choose investment 
methods among CRS technology, capital markets and the risky project with a 
set up cost. Another interesting difference is that distribution in our model is 
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continuous while in their case is not. It is a significant improvement because a 
continuous investment model is more common. 
 
In our model, individuals only differ from their initial endowments. The 
restriction of initial wealth and the existing of set-up cost of the risky project 
make them to choose different investment methods. For example, individuals 
whose wealth cannot meet the set-up cost have to invest in either the capital 
market or CRS technology. The Medium-wealth individuals will consider either 
to borrow a small amount of capital to approach the full investment level, or 
maintain the sub-optimal status. Since lenders cannot observe the realized 
returns of the risky project, entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to default 
and pay the liquidated value, which is far lower than the expected returns, to 
the lenders. Hence lenders will provide funds no more than the liquidated 
value of the project to any borrowers if monitoring cost is infinite. In this 
environment, there are some explicit thresholds which divide individuals into 
different groups. The credit ration in phenomenon is also discussed in an 
alternative model by Matsuyama (2007). The interest rate of the capital market 
is endogenously determined in our model.  
 
In order to make lenders observing project's returns, financial intermediaries 
such as banks introduce a monitoring technology which is equivalent to the 
µcostly state verification´ environment and is originally studied by Townsend 
(1979). The monitoring technology makes it possible that the external lenders 
can observe the realized returns of the project. But the cost of monitoring also 
makes bank loans more expensive than direct finance. Individuals in the 
economy now have an alternative source to collect necessary money. Our 
result shows that the poorest individuals are still pure lenders. But some 
relatively poor individuals alter from lenders to entrepreneurs by obtaining 
bank loans to invest optimally. On the other hands, part of low to medium 
wealth agents prefer to the capital market because of the lower cost of direct 
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finance, they invest sub-optimally. Meanwhile, other low to medium wealth 
individuals choose bank loans and invest optimally. The novelty in our analysis 
is that decreasing marginal returns imply that the optimal size of the project is 
finite, and thus we can make prediction about the level of underinvestment. We 
also use the model to explore how changes in the distribution affect the 
predictions of the model. 
 
The set of arguments such as the mean wealth and the difference of wealth in 
this model have obvious effects on variables of the model, we then run 
comparative statics to examine how these arguments affect the model. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 introduces the 
general framework of the model. Section 2.4 briefly discusses the case of 
perfect capital markets. Section 2.5 explores the imperfect capital market 
conditions when financial intermediaries are prohibited. The monitoring 
technology is introduced in section 2.6 in which bank loans are available. 
Section 2.7 is a comparative statics extension of section2.5. We conclude in 
the last section.  
 
2.3 The Model Framework 
There is a continuum of risk-neutral agents of measure 1 indexed by i . A 
single good can be either invested or consumed. An individual i  is endowed 
with iW  initially, where ],[


 WWWi . Let )(WG  denotes the distribution of 
endowments across agents, )(Wg  is the corresponding density function. 
Then the mean wealth of the economy is ³


 W
W ii
dWWgWW )(
^
. The economy 
involves two stages, (  t 0, 1). The individual makes an investment decision at 
the first stage and consumes at the next one. Three different ways of 
investment are available in the system. The first one is a CRS technology that 
yields Z (>1) for each unit input. This method is a definitely secure way to 
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invest. Opposite to the riskless CRS, the second method is rather risky. 
Suppose there is a project requiring a fixed cost )0(!K . The positive K means 
that the risky project needs some basic facilities such lands and machines. 
The liquidated value l  directly comes from liquidating these assets so that 
Kl  . If the fixed cost is zero then there is no liquidated value and lenders 
would not provide any money when they suffer from information asymmetry. 
/HW¶Vconsider iI  being the exclusive production investment of the project for 
the individual i , where ],0[ fiI . The total investment of the individual then 
must be iIK  .  The project succeeds with a probability p . Once succeed, it 
produces a return of )( iIf . Otherwise it is liquidated with the value l  if fails. 
Here we assume '( ) 0if I !  and "( ) 0if I   so that the function curve is 
concave and the investment is limited. It is an important assumption because it 
makes sure that the marginal return of the project is decreasing. So there is an 
optimal investment level to maximize the profits. Lastly, the individual a can 
also invest in the capital market to earn ER (>1). We¶ll discuss the interest rate 
ER  later since it is endogenously determined in the system.  
 
There are a few restrictions on the variables of the project. Firstly, the project 
must be profitable. Put differently, the expected return must be higher than the 
investment input. Otherwise no one would undertake the risky project. Since 
the expected return of the risky project is 
lpIpf i )1()(                                  (2.1) 
and the total investment is iK I , then  
( ) (1 )i ipf I p l K I  t   
Suppose each unit return of the project is )( iIR , then 
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( ) (1 )( ) 1ii
i
pf I p lR I
K I
  t                      (2.2) 
 
In addition, )( iIR  must not be lower than the return from the capital market, 
namely ER . Suppose ( ) EiR I R , all agents would prefer to invest in the 
capital market and it would increase the supply of funds in the capital market. 
Hence the price of credit ER  would reduce until it is no higher than )( iIR . In 
other words,  
E
i RIR t)(  
The inequality above implies that there is a minimal level of investment in 
which individuals are indifferent to invest either in the risky technology or in the 
capital market. Let the minimal level be I . It is determined by 
              
( ) ( 1 )
( ) E
pf I p l
R I R
K I



                      (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) shows that the minimal investment level is a function of ER . 
Let¶s denote it as )( ERI . 
 
Thirdly, the conditions 0)(;0)( "' ! ii IfIf  prevent the investment from 
infinitely increasing. So there is also a maximum investment level, *I . It can 
be produced by maximizing the risky project's revenue. 
The expected profit of the project is just the difference between the expected 
return and the total investment, that is 
> @ )()1()( ii IKlpIpf   
The maximum investment level is obtained by taking the first order derivative 
of the above equation with respect to I and equating it with zero. That is 
'( ) 1 0ipf I    
Therefore 
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pIf /1)(' *                             (2.4).  
The optimal investment value *I  is derived from (2.4). Then the 
corresponding optimal return of each unit from the project is  
*
*
* )1()(
IK
lpIpfR 
                          (2.5) 
The investment falls in the scope of *
_
)( IIRI iE dd . 
 
Furthermore, since the connection between the minimal investment level I  
and the interest rate ER relates to the investment decision, it is also necessary 
to reveal their relationship. The most intuitive ways is to make the first order 
derivative of (2.3) to I . That is 
'( )
( )
EE pf I RdR
d I K I

 
  .
1
 
 
The result shows that the sign of the first order derivate is determined by 
'( ) Epf I R  . Here the first item is exactly the marginal returns of the project at 
the minimal investment level. We know the minimal investment I  is a cut-off 
value where the capital market and the project yield the same returns. Hence 
an individual is indifferent to carry out either investment method at this point. 
However, according to the definition of the minimal threshold, if we add a few 
credits to the project, its return must be higher than the profits of the capital 
market, otherwise no one would choose the risky technology. Put it in another 
                                                             
1
 2
( ) (1 )
'( )( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ]
( )
E
pf I p l
d
K I pf I K I pf I p ldR
d I d I K I

   
  
§ · ¨ ¸¨ ¸    © ¹  
 
( ) (1 )
'( )
'( )
( ) ( )
E
pf I p l
pf I
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

 
 
      
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way, suppose the marginal increment is d I , 
[ ( ) (1 ) ] [ ( ) (1 ) ]
'( )
E
E E
d pf I p l d pf I p l d I R
pf I R R
d I d I
  

 
          
 
Obviously, the marginal return of the project [ ( ) (1 ) ]d pf I p l    must be higher 
than the marginal return from the capital market Ed I R . Therefore 
'( ) 0Epf I R  !  and 0
EdR
d I
! . To conclude, the minimal investment value 
)( ERI must move in the same direction with 
ER .  
 
Finally, the maximal return of the capital market should not be higher than *R , 
otherwise all agents would prefer to invest the capital market. Similarly, there is 
no way that ZRE  , otherwise  individuals would never lend  money. In 
conclusion, the inequality *RRZ E dd must be hold. It  implies that the 
optimal return of the risky technology is higher than that of the CRS: 
Assumption 1: ZR !*
 
 
 
We presume that the maximal investment falls into the range below: 
Assumption 2: 


 WIKW *
 
 
In the following sections we will divide the model into two parts. One is 
discussed under the perfect market condition; the other is in the imperfect 
market taking account of the moral hazard problem. The latter is further 
distinguished by whether there is a bank in the system. 
 
2.4 Perfect Capital Markets 
Under the perfect market condition, both an individual¶s initial endowment and 
the return of the project are public information. It leaves no private benefit to 
entrepreneurs. Because the moral hazard problem is not present, lenders are 
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always willing to provide full funds.  
 
Proposition 1 Perfect Capital Market Equilibrium: 
 
1) If *^ IKW !  then ZRE  . There is an excess supply of credits. All 
projects are funded at the optimal level. The total funds flows to CRS 
technology is )( *
^
IKW   
2) If *^ IKW   then *RRE  . There is an excess demand of credits. The 
proportion of project funded at the optimal level is equal to )/( *^ IKW  . No 
one invests CRS technology. 
 
Proof: 
Under the perfect capital market condition, all information is public. Public 
information eliminates dishonest behaviour. So an individual can raise funds to 
invest the risky technology even her initial wealth is zero.  
1) The inequality *^ IKW !  implies a rich economy in which the average 
wealth is higher than the maximal investment level. There is an excess 
supply of funds because the aggregate wealth exceeds the aggregate 
demand of credits. Competition in the capital market results in an 
equilibrium interest rate ZRE  . Since ZR !* , all agents would prefer to 
be entrepreneurs. All projects are fully funded at the optimal level. The 
aggregate funds for CRS is )( *
^
IKW  .2 It is shown in Figure 2.1. 
                                                             
2
 The total funds flowing to the CRS technology equals to the difference 
between the supply and the demand of credits. In this case, the former is 
*
*( ) ( )
W
i i
K I
W K I g W dW


ª º ¬ ¼³  and the latter is 
*
*( ) ( )
K I
i i
W
K I W g W dW


ª º ¬ ¼³  .  
*
*
* *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
W K I
i i i i
WK I
W K I g W dW K I W g W dW




ª º ª º    ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼³ ³  
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*K I   ^W                           W  
Figure 2.1 
 
2) If inequality *^ IKW   holds, this means that is a poor economy. The 
capital market cannot support all projects and there is an excess demand 
for credits. If *RRE   then all agents with the wealth *IKWi   prefer to 
borrow iWIK  *  to be entrepreneurs. The demand of credits would 
raise the capital market returns until *R . Alternatively, if *RRE !  then all 
agents prefer to invest in the capital market. It leads to an excess supply of 
funds so that ER  goes down to *R . Therefore the equilibrium return of the 
capital market must be equal to *R .  Agents will be indifferent between 
investing either in the capital market or in the risky technology. The 
situation is exhibited in Figure 2.2.  
 
 
                                                     
         
W

   
  
                  
^
W   *K I                   W  
Figure 2.2  
                                                                                                                                                                              
*( ) ( )
W
i i
W
W K I g W dW


ª º  ¬ ¼³  
*( ) ( )
W
i i
W
Wg W dW K I


  ³  
^
*( )W K I    
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In this case, the return of the capital market is the same as that of the 
 project, namely *RRE  . Individuals are different between two methods 
 and there is no distinct boundary between lenders and borrowers.  The 
proportion of agents whose investment is the optimal level  is  equal to 
)/( *
^
IKW  .
 
3
 
 
 
2.5 Imperfect Capital Markets without Banking 
Under the conditions of asymmetric information, the return of project is private 
information. Since monitoring is unavailable, entrepreneurs naturally have the 
incentive to report a return no more than l  even though they succeed in the 
project. In other words, a lender maximally obtains l  no matter how much the 
project earns. Therefore the maximum credits that a lender is willing to lend 
equals ERl / . We know the requirement of being an entrepreneur is the wealth 
is no smaller than ( )EK I R . The equilibrium return thus defines a cut-off 
value that is )/()()( EEEc RlRIKRW   . All agents with wealth 
)( Eci RWW   cannot access capital markets in order to raise enough money 
for the risky project. The conditions Kl   and 1!ER  also implies 
0)( !Ec RW . 
                                                             
3
 The equilibrium is achieved when the supply of credits meets the demand.  
Suppose the proportion of entrepreneur is H. In this case, ( )
W
i i
W
Wg W dW


³  is the 
supply while *( )H K I   is the demand. Then ^ *( ) ( )
W
i i
W
Wg W dW W K I H


   ³ . 
So the proportion of agents whose investment is the optimal level equals 
)/( *
^
IKW   
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In order to make the model applicable to a general situation, we assume some 
very poor individuals cannot borrow from capital market. That means the 
lowest wealth is less than the cut-off value. Formally,  
Assumption 3: )(ZWW c

 
 
The return of the risky technology is an increasing function of investment 
because '( ) 0if I ! . An individual will keep investing the project until it reaches 
the optimal level. Aggregate demand and supply of credits are thus determined 
by the optimal value *I  and the return of the capital market, ER . The 
expected supply of credits in the economy is:  
> @³³


 


W
IK
ii
RlRIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
EE
*
)()()( *
)/()(
 
The first item covers all individuals who are too poor to carry out the risky 
technology. They have to invest in either the capital market or CRS technology. 
The second item involves a few rich individuals whose wealth exceeds the 
optimal investment level. They want to lend the rest of funds or invest them in 
CRS. In addition, the expected demand of credit is: 
³³ 





*
*
*
)/(
*
)/(
)/()(
)()()()/(
IK
RlIK
ii
RlIK
RlRIK
i
E
E
E
EE
dWWgWIKdWWgRl  
The first item shows those individuals who can maximally borrow ERl /  to 
undertake the risky project at a suboptimal investment position. The second 
one exhibits all agents who qualify for borrowing iWIK  *  to achieve the 
optimal investment level of the project. The equilibrium of capital market is 
approached as the total supply of credits equals its total demand. This general 
situation is shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Proposition 2 Imperfect Capital Market Equilibrium without Banking: 
 
1) If ³³ 





*
*
*
)/(
*
)/(
)/()(
)()()()/(
IK
ZlIK
ii
ZlIK
ZlZIK
i dWWgWIKdWWgZl  
> @³³


 


W
IK
ii
ZlZIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
*
)()()( *
)/()(
,  
then ZRE  . There is an excess supply of credits in the economy. The 
spare funds will be invested in CRS. The proportion of suboptimal 
investment individuals is ³


)/(
)/()(
*
)(
ZlIK
ZlZIK
idWWg . The proportion of agents who 
achieve optimal level investment is ³


W
ZlIK
idWWg
)/(*
)( . The total credits flowing 
into CRS is  
> @³³


 


W
IK
ii
ZlZIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
*
)()()( *
)/()(
.
³³ 





*
*
*
)/(
*
)/(
)/()(
)()()()/(
IK
ZlIK
ii
ZlIK
ZlZIK
i dWWgWIKdWWgZl  
 
2) If > @³³³

 


!
W
IK
ii
RlIK
W
ii
IK
RlIK
ii dWWgIKWdWWgWdWWgWIK
*
***
**
)()()()()( *
)/(
)/(
*
  
then *RRE  . There is an excess demand of credit. No one invest in CRS 
technology.  
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3) If > @³³


 


W
IK
ii
ZlZIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
*
)()()( *
)/()(
 
³³ 

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
d

*
*
*
)/(
*
)/(
)/()(
)()()()/(
IK
RlIK
ii
RlIK
RlRIK
i
E
E
E
EE
dWWgWIKdWWgRl  
> @³³

 

d
W
IK
ii
RlIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
*
**
)()()( *
)/(
 
then *RRZ E dd . The proportion of the risky project with suboptimal 
investment is ³


)/(
)/()(
*
)(
E
EE
RlIK
RlRIK
idWWg . The proportion of the optimal level project is 
³


W
RlIK
i
E
dWWg
/*
)( . There is no CRS investment. 
 
Proof. 
1) The lowest capital market return must not be less than Z, otherwise all 
agents would prefer to invest in CRS. When the inequality holds, there is an 
excess supply of funds because the projects that entrepreneurs are willing 
to invest. The situation reduces the interest rate ER  to Z. Entrepreneurs, 
regardless of the sub-optimal groups or those fully invested groups, are 
both funded. The proportions of them are   ³


)/(
)/()(
*
)(
ZlIK
ZlZIK
idWWg  and
³


W
ZlIK
idWWg
)/(*
)( , respectively. Spare funds are invested in CRS technology. 
The total amount of funds for CRS is 
> @³³


 


W
IK
ii
ZlZIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
*
)()()( *
)/()(
.
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The situation is shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
      Supply             Demand              Supply 
              A            B              C            D 
         
W

   ( ) lK I Z Z 
     
* lK I Z         *K I         W

 
Figure 2.4 
 
2) The highest return of capital market must be no higher than *R , otherwise 
agents would never consider the risky project. When the inequality holds, 
there is an excess demand for credits because the amount of project that 
entrepreneurs are willing to invest is higher than lenders can fund. The 
scarcity of funds makes the interest rate increase to *R . In addition, the 
condition *ER R  means 
*
*
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )pf I p l pf I p l
K I K I


      . Comparing 
both sides of the equation we conclude that *I I   under this situation. In 
other words, the minimal investment is equal to its optimal value as long as 
*RRE  . The continuous invest model shrinks to a fixed model in this case. 
No one invests in CRS technology. This situation is shown in Figure 2.5. 
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3) The minimal supply of funds in the economy is 
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*
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 when ZRE  , and the 
maximal supply of funds is > @³³

 


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when *RRE  . The inequality means the demand of credits in the 
economy varies between the maximum and the minimum value of supply. 
When the inequality holds, there is an excess demand of credits if ZRE   
and an excess supply of credits if *RRE  . In this case ER  moves 
between Z  and *R . It reaches its equilibrium point as long as the total 
demand equals the total supply, namely the market clear point. Therefore 
the proportion of project funded at the optimal level is ³


W
RlIK
i
E
dWWg
/*
)( . The 
proportion of under-investment project is ³


)/(
)/()(
*
)(
E
EE
RlIK
RlRIK
idWWg  . Because at the 
market clear point the supply of funds is equal to the demand, there is no 
spare fund for the CRS. The situation is shown in Figure 2.6. 
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2.6 Imperfect Capital Markets with Banking 
In this section we introduce a new monitoring technology which allows lenders 
observe borrowers' returns with a finite cost. We assume the cost is positive. 
The situation is equivalent to the costly state verification framework which were 
studied by Townsend (1979). Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 
1987). They state that the verification problem leads to credit rationing. We 
24 
 
introduce an intermediary call the bank who owns the monitoring technology. 
Individuals can put money into the bank or just provide fund through the capital 
market directly while the later do not have any monitoring technology. 
 
Assumption 4: The monitoring cost per unit is m>0. 
 
This innovation makes bank loans available for borrowers. The entrepreneurs 
may borrow more than ER
l
 under the monitoring technology while the 
returns are observed by lenders. The project will be liquated if the returns are 
lower than expectation.4 Suppose the loan repayment in the contract is P and 
the size is B. The financial markets consist of two sections in this economy. 
One is the direct funds part, namely the capital market. The other is the loan 
market. Thus the lenders have an alternative way to invest their wealth. If the 
return of loan market are higher than that of the capital market, all lenders 
would prefer to the former. Credits supply of the loan market thus increases, 
which reduces its return. A similar process occurs when the return of the 
capital market is higher the loan market. Consequently there must be an 
equilibrium return of loan marketOHW¶VFDOOLW bR , which produces a reasonable 
repayment to eliminates the gap between the returns of the two markets. In 
other word, a lender will be indifferent between investing the capital market 
and the loan market if both returns equal. That is: 
))(1( mBlppPBRE                       (2.6) 
The right hand side of (2.6) states if the project succeeds with the probability p, 
the returns of total loan is P. If the project is liquidated with the value l, the total 
                                                             
4
 From the point of liquidation view, individuals can only access one credit 
source at a time. Once they choose to borrow from the capital market, they 
leave no liquidation value to the loan market. So they access either the capital 
market or the bank loan.  
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monitoring cost mB must be deducted from the returns. So  
> @^ `lpmpRB
p
P E )1()1(1                     (2.7) 
 
Furthermore, the interest rate of the loan market is 
(1 )
b
pP p lR
B
                           (2.8) 
Comparing (2.6) and (2.8) we have: 
mpRR Eb )1(                            (2.9) 
Lenders are indifferent to investing in either markets under such conditions. 
The equation also implies that the price of loan market is more expensive than 
capital market because of the monitoring cost. Naturally, the capital market has 
priority if both markets are available. 
 
In the previous section, individuals whose wealth is less than ( )E ElK I R R   
are too poor to undertake the risky technology. The introduction of the 
monitoring technology make it possible for them to get more than ER
l
.  
Therefore a few poor individuals may raise required money instead. They will 
be indifferent to lend their money or to borrow iWIK  *  to carry out the 
risky projectˈ if the following condition holds: 
*[ ( ) ]EiWR p f I P                       (2.10) 
subjects to the restriction: ( ) ( )c E E Ei lW W R K I R R    . 
Equation (2.10) describes that an individual whose initial wealth is iW  will be 
indifferent to lend all the money or to invest in the risky project if the return of 
the latter, after repaying the bank loan, is equal to the former. It also implies 
that there is a cut-off endowment level, )( Eb RW , such that all agents with 
endowment between )( Eb RW  and )( Ec RW  will be better off if they borrow 
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iWIK  *  and invest in the project. However, those individuals whose wealth 
is lower than the cut-off value are too poor to afford the loan. They will lend out 
money or invest in CRS technology. 
 
According to the definition,  iW  in the left hand side of (2.10) is actually the 
threshold )( Eb RW . Substituting (2.7) for P in (2.10), we have 
^ `* *1( ) ( ) ( ( )) (1 ) (1 )b E E b E EW R R p f I K I W R R p m p lp­ ½ª º        ® ¾¬ ¼¯ ¿  
Rearranging the equation gives 
»¼
º«¬
ª

 
mp
RRIKRW
E
Eb
)1(
)(1)()(
*
*
                  (2.11) 
( )b EW R  from (2.11) must be smaller than ( )c EW R . The reason is simple. If 
( ) ( )b E c EW R W Rt , it means someone prefer bank loans rather than direct 
funds. But we know bank loans is much costly than direct funds. So it would 
never happen if ( ) ( )b E c EW R W Rt . (2.11) tells that )( Eb RW also changes 
simultaneously with ER . 
 
In fact, the loan market benefits not only the poor individuals, but also a few 
entrepreneurs whose endowments are between )( Ec RW  and ER
lIK  * . 
In the capital market, they can maximally borrow ER
l
 and stay in the 
suboptimal investment situation because of imperfect information. Now they 
can borrow from the loan market to meet the optimal investment level. 
However, the cost of the loan market is higher than that of the capital market. 
Agents would switch from the capital market to the loan market only if they 
were better off. In other words, agents will be indifferent between staying in the 
suboptimal investment status or making a loan to reach the optimal investment 
level if  
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*[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]Ei lp f I P p f W K lR                  (2.12) 
Under the constraint: EiEc R
lIKWRW d *)( . 
 
The left hand side of (2.12) shows the expected returns of a fully funded 
project after paying off the loan. The right hand side indicates the expected 
returns of a sub-optimal funded project in which the entrepreneur accesses the 
capital market only. Obviously, (2.12) defines another cut-RIIYDOXHOHW¶VFDOOLW
)( Ed RW , which divides individuals with the wealth in the range of 
)),([ * EEc R
lIKRW   into two groups. The first group accesses the capital 
market as usual and maximally borrowks ER
l
 to sustain the suboptimal 
funded project. Another group is better off by borrowing from the loan market 
and meets the optimal investment level. This situation is plotted in Figure 2.7. 
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We have seen there are two extra thresholds in Figure 2.7 comparing the 
previous graph. Area B presents a few poor individuals who do not qualify for 
accessing the capital market can carry out the optimal level project by 
borrowing from bank. Furthermore, the individuals in either area C or area D 
who have performed the suboptimal funded project by raising money from the 
capital market can have fully funded project for the same reason. The point is 
that it is ambiguous which group of individuals will propose to access the loan 
market. One fact is that the price of the loan market is higher than that of the 
capital market because of the monitoring cost. The more funds the individuals 
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borrow from the loan market, the more repayment they have. If only they 
benefit from the choice, they would not access the loan market. Suppose there 
is an individual whose wealth is in the area D, namely the scope of 
)),([ * EEd R
lIKRW  . His wealth can be written as H Ei RlIKW
*
, 
where )(0 * EdE RWR
lIK d H . If he borrows El R  only from the capital 
market, his welfare, CWF , is *( )CWF pf I plH     5 .Alternatively, if he 
borrows from the loan market, his welfare, LWF  is  
* (1 )( ) (1 )L EE
p mlWF pf I pl R p m
R
H ª º     ¬ ¼  6 
There is no point switching from the capital market to the loan market if 
L CWF WF . In addition, as one would expect, both LWF  and CWF  rise as 
the endowments increase7. Suppose there is a position close to ER
lIK  * . 
                                                             
5
 > @lKRlWfpWF EiC  )(   > @lKRlRlIKfp EE  )( * H  
plIpf  )( * H  
6
 > @PIfpWF L  )( *   
^ `* *1( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )Eipf I p K I W R p m p lp          
* * *( ) [ ( )] [ (1 ) ] (1 )EElpf I K I K I R p m p lR H             
*( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )EElpf I R p m p lR H         
> @mpR
R
mlpplIpf EE )1(
)1()( *  H  
7
 
* *[ ( ) ] '( ) 0
CWF pf I pl pf IH HH H
w w      w w   
^ `*[ ( ) ] [ (1 ) ] 0L EWF p f I P R p mH Hw w      w w   
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In other words, 0oH . Then CWF  is approaching plIpf )( *  while LWF  is 
approximating to ER
mlpplIpf )1()( *  . Apparently the former is larger than 
the latter because the sign of ER
mlp)1( 
 is positive. The result unveils a fact 
that at the point close to ER
lIK  * , an individual prefers the suboptimal 
investment status to the fully funded situation because he would not benefit 
from switching to the loan market. The difference between two kinds of welfare 
reaches its maximum level, ER
mlp)1( 
, when 0H  . So if iW  moves 
backwards the point ( )C EW R , such gap will fade away. In fact, a left 
movement of iW  means that H  is indeed increasing. We know that both 
LWF  and CWF  are decreasing functions of H . An expanding H
 
makes both 
of them shrink at different rate. LWF
 
reduces at the speed 
(1 )
L
EWF R p mH
w   w  which is a constant while the latter changes at an 
accelerating rate *'( )
CWF pf I HH
w  w . The situation illustrates that 
CWF
 
reduces faster than LWF
 
and eventually they will meet at the threshold 
( )d EW R . Individuals on the left side of the point, namely the area C in Figure 
2.7, prefer to borrow from the loan market and achieve the optimal investment 
level. Meanwhile, individuals in the area D have no motivation to switch to the 
loan market because they would not benefit from it. Those individuals whose 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Both LWF  and CWF  are decreasing functions of H . Because H  also 
negatively relates to iW , they are increasing functions of iW . The result is 
consistent with the expectation that the richer the individuals are, the more the 
profits are. 
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wealth is precisely )( Ed RW will be indifferent to access either the capital 
market or the loan market. 
 
Finally, the supply side of the economy consists of two parts: 
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The individuals who are too poor to invest the risky project are presented in the 
first item. The second item shows the rich individuals who have spare capital to 
supply to the markets. The demand side of the economy is divided into four 
parts: 
( ) ( )
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The first item shows those agents who access the loan market. The second 
item presents their monitoring cost. The third item describes those agents 
maximally borrow ER
l
 from the capital market and stay in the suboptimal 
investment status. The fourth item indicates those agents who obtain full funds 
from the capital market. 
 
Proposition 3 
1)  If ³³³

 


t
W
IK
ii
R
lIK
W
ii
IK
R
lIK
ii dWWgKIWdWWgWdWWgWIK
*
*
*
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*
*
)()()()()( **  
then *RRE  . There is an excess demand for credit. The proportion of the 
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fully funded project is ³


W
R
lIK
idWWg
*
*
)( . No one wants to make a loan or to 
invest in CRS technology. 
 
2)  If ³³³

 



W
IK
ii
R
lIK
W
ii
IK
R
lIK
ii dWWgKIWdWWgWdWWgWIK
*
*
*
*
*
*
)()()()()( **  
 Then either 
a) ZRE  , mpZRb )1(  . There is an excess supply of credit. The 
proportion of agents with full investment is ³³



W
Z
lIK
i
ZW
ZW
i dWWgdWWg
d
b *
)()(
)(
)(
. 
The proportion of agents with under-investment is ³
 ZlIK
ZW
i
d
dWWg
*
)(
)( . After 
meeting the demand of credits, the rest funds flow into CRS 
technology. Or 
b) 1RRZ E  , where 1R  corresponds to the interest rate from the 
capital market when )()()( EdEcEb RWRWRW   . mpRR Eb )1(  . 
The proportion of the risky technology funded at the optimal level is 
³³



W
R
lIK
i
RW
RW
i
E
Ed
Eb
dWWgdWWg
*
)()(
)(
)(
. The proportion of the risky technology 
funded at the under-investment level is ³
 E
Ed
R
lIK
RW
idWWg
*
)(
)( . No one invests  
INCRS technology. Or 
c) *1 RRR E d . There is no banking loan. The proportion of the risky 
technology funded at the optimal level is ³


W
R
lIK
i
E
dWWg
*
)( . The 
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proportion of the risky technology funded at the suboptimal investment 
level is ³
 E
Ec
R
lIK
RW
idWWg
*
)(
)( . No one invests in CRS technology either.  
 
Proof: 
1) This is actually the same situation as the second case of proposition 2. The 
maximal interest rate never exceed *R , otherwise no one  would 
considers the risky technology. When the inequality holds, there is an 
excess demand for credits because the proportion of project that 
entrepreneurs are willing to carry out is higher than the proportion of project 
that lenders can fund. A shortage of credits cause the interest rate jump to 
*R . In the previous section we have proofed that **)( IRI    and 
consequently ***)( R
lIKRWc   in this situation. Regarding to the 
condition of EEdEc R
lIKRWRW d *)()( , )( Ed RW  disappears as 
soon as *RRE  . Furthermore, substituting *RRE   for (2.11) gives 
*
* *( )( ) ( ) 1 (1 )
E
b E R RW R K I K I
p m
ª º    « »¬ ¼
. If the interest rate reaches its 
maximal value *R , then **)( IKRWb  . It conflicts with the definition that 
)()( EcEb RWRW  . The result implies that )( Eb RW  also disappears in this 
case. In other words, because the price of loan is too high to afford, no one 
wants to borrow from banks. The group of suboptimal investment vanishes 
too. Finally, the proportion of the fully funded project is ³


W
R
lIK
idWWg
*
*
)( . 
There is no role for CRS technology because the capital market is clear. 
The situation is shown in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8 
 
2) Looking back Figure 2.7 we find that all thresholds )( Eb RW , )( Ec RW  and
)( Ed RW  are functions of the interest rate. They must vary as the interest 
rate changes and consequently affect the demand and supply of funds. 
Therefore it is essential to determine how they react to the change of the 
interest rate. We have shown that )( Ec RW  acts upon the change of ER . 
(2.11) indicates that )( Eb RW  positively relates to the interest rate. It is 
necessary to explore the connection between )( Ed RW  and ER .  
 
Suppose an individual's wealth is located in area C plus D in Figure 2.7, 
namely EiEc R
lIKWRW d *)( . If he borrows from the capital market, 
his welfare, CWF , is [ ( ) ]C Ei lWF p f W K lR     and  
0)(')( 2  w
w KRlWfR
pl
R
WF
EiEE
C
. This first order partial derivative 
shows a rise in the interest rate has an opposite effect on welfare. In 
addition, 0)(")(
)(
2
2
! ww
w KRlWfR
pl
WR
WF
EiE
i
E
C
. The second order 
partial derivative indicates that the loss rate of the welfare 
C
E
WF
R
w
w  is an 
increasing function relating to iW . However, 
C
E
WF
R
w
w  is negative. An 
increase in 
C
E
WF
R
w
w   then implies a decrease in its absolute value. In other 
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words, the welfare loss is larger near )( Ed RW  rather than at the point of 
ER
lIK  * . So the poor are more fragile than the richer when the interest 
rate changes. 
 
Alternatively, if the individual borrows from banks, the welfare is 
* * * *( ) ( )(1 ) ( )L Ei iWF R I K K I W p m K I W R         8   
So 0)( *  w
w
iE
L
WIK
R
WF
 and 01)(
2
! ww
w
i
E
L
WR
WF
. 
The results is completely similar to the previous one such that a rising 
interest rate does harm individuals' welfare and the poor suffer more  than 
the richer.  
 
In order to detect how )( Ed RW  responds to the change of the interest rate, 
we need to compare individuals' welfare under this situation. Suppose the 
interest rate increases and 
C L
E E
WF WF
R R
w w!w w , it tells that the loss of raising 
money from the capital market is larger than that from banks. Then 
entrepreneurs prefer to borrow from the latter. Eventually )( Ed RW  move 
towards right and vice versa. Unfortunately, we cannot compare the welfare 
loss directly at the point of )( Ed RW . Since 
C
E
WF
R
w
w  and 
L
E
WF
R
w
w  are 
smaller as iW  increases, we can investigate the result at the point of 
                                                             
8
 > @PIfpWF L  )( *  
> @^ `lpmpRWIK
p
pIpf Ei )1()1()(
1)( **   
E
ii RWIKmpWIKKIR )()1)(()( ****   
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ER
lIK  *  firstly. Let's consider individuals who are extremely close to 
this cut-off value. Substituting * Ei lW K I R    for 
C
E
WF
R
w
w  and 
L
E
WF
R
w
w  
gives 1
C
E E E
WF l
R R R
w  w
9
 and EE
L
R
l
R
WF  w
w
. Obviously E
L
E
C
R
WF
R
WF
w
ww
w
. 
The result reveals that at the position close to  ER
lIK  *  the change 
of welfare relative to ER  is larger if the agent borrows from the loan 
market than the change if she borrows from the capital market. 
Furthermore, since both of the sensitivities, 
C
E
WF
R
w
w  and 
L
E
WF
R
w
w , are 
increase as iW  decreases. Therefore the result still holds when 
)( Edi RWW   because EEd RlIKRW 
*)( . Suppose there is a small 
increment of ER , the individuals who were indifferent to borrow from either 
markets now prefers to collect funds from the capital market. That is to say, 
)( Ed RW  moves in a reverse direction of ER . In conclusion, if ER
increases from an equilibrium situation,  ( )b EW R  and ( )c EW R  increase 
as well. Meanwhile, ( )d EW R decreases instead. 
 
a) The lowest capital markets return ER  must be no smaller than Z, 
otherwise all individuals prefer to invest in CRS technology. There is an 
excess supply of funds because the proportion of project that 
entrepreneurs are willing to invest is less than the proportion of project 
that lenders could fund. Over-supply credits reduce ER to Z. All 
entrepreneurs are funded. No one would like to borrow from banks 
because of the high price. The proportion of individuals with 
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full-investment is ³³



W
Z
lIK
i
ZW
ZW
i dWWgdWWg
d
b *
)()(
)(
)(
. The proportion of 
individuals with suboptimal investment is ³
 ZlIK
ZW
i
d
dWWg
*
)(
)( . The rest funds 
flow into CRS . 
The situation is shown in Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9 
 
b) We have known that as ER  increases, both )( Eb RW  and )( Ec RW  
increase while )( Ed RW  decreases. )( Ed RW  will inevitably meet 
)( Ec RW  and disappear. However, it is still ambiguous whether  
)( Eb RW  will catch )( Ec RW . Eventually, three of them meet at one 
point. The issue can be investigated by detecting where )( Eb RW  goes 
as long as )( Ec RW  meets )( Ec RW . 
 
We know )( Ed RW  is determined by (2.12),  
*[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]Ei lp f I P p f W K lR      
Substituting (2.7) for the left item of (2.12) leads to 
*[ ( ) ]p f I P  
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* * *( )( ) ( )(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) ]E d E ER R K I K I p m W R R p m         10 
At the moment ( ) ( )d E c EW R W R  and ( ) ( )c E E ElW R K I R R   . 
Substituting (2.3) for ( ) ( )c E E ElW R K I R R    gives 
( ( ))
( )
E
c E
E
pf I R pl
W R
R
   
Then E
E
EcEd
R
plRIpf
RWRW
   ))(()()( . Substituting it for the left 
hand side  of  (2.12) gives 
*[ ( ) ]p f I P  
* * *( )( ) ( )(1 ) [ ( ( )) ] ( )(1 )E E c ER R K I K I p m pf I R pl W R p m         
11
 
In addition, substituting EEEcEd R
lRIKRWRW    )()()(  for the 
right hand side  of (2.12) obtains 
[ ( ( ) ) ] ( ( ))d E EElp f W R K l pf I R plR     
12
 
 
Putting both left and right hand sides  together gives 
                                                             
10
 
*[ ( ) ]p f I P
 
* *( ) ( ( )) (1 ) (1 )d E Epf I K I W R R p m p lª º       ¬ ¼
 
* * *( )( ) ( )(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) ]E d E ER R K I K I p m W R R p m        
 
11
 
*[ ( ) ]p f I P  
* * *( )( ) ( )(1 ) ( )[ (1 ) ]E d E ER R K I K I p m W R R p m        
 
* * *
( ( ))
( )( ) ( )(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
E
E E
E
pf I R pl
R R K I K I p m R p m
R
         
 
* * *
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( )( ) ( )(1 ) [ ( ( )) ] (1 )
E
E E
E
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R


         
 
* * *( )( ) ( )(1 ) ( ( )) ( )(1 )E E c ER R K I K I p m pf I R pl W R p m           
12
 [ ( ( ) ) ]d E Elp f W R K lR    
[ ( ( ) ) ]E E El lp f K I R K lR R       
plRIpf E   ))((  
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> @ mpRWplRIpfmpIKIKRR EcEE )1)(())(()1)(())(( ***    
plRIpf E   ))((  
Finally, by rearranging the equation we have  
)()1(
)(1)()()(
*
* Eb
E
EcEd RW
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º«¬
ª

   
 
The result reveals that as ER  increases, )( Eb RW , )( Ec RW  and 
)( Ed RW  eventually meet together. It defines a cut-off interest rate of 
the capital market, let's call it 1R , so that any interest rates higher than 
the value will eliminate the demand of bank loans. In other words, the 
poor individuals find it is too expensive to borrow from banks. Only if 
1RRZ
E  , those poor individuals might benefit from the low interest 
rate and approach the optimal investment level. The interest rate of the 
loan market is mpRR Eb )1(  . The proportion of the risky 
technology funded at the optimal level is ³³



W
R
lIK
i
RW
RW
i
E
Ed
Eb
dWWgdWWg
*
)()(
)(
)(
. 
The proportion of the risky technology funded at the under-investment 
level is ³
 E
Ed
R
lIK
RW
idWWg
*
)(
)( . No one invests in the CRS technology. The 
situation is shown below: 
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Figure 2.10 
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c) If *1 RRR E d , the loan market disappears because the cost is too 
high to afford. The situation is the same as the case 3 of the proposition 
2. The proportion of the risky technology funded at the optimal level is 
³


W
R
lIK
i
E
dWWg
*
)( . The proportion of the risky technology funded at the 
suboptimal level is 
*
( )
( )
E
c E
lK I
R
i
W R
g W dW
 
³ . There is no CRS investment as 
well. The situation is shown in Figure 2.11. 
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2.7 Comparative Statics, An extension of the Asymmetric Information 
Model 
By now the model defines a few of endogenous variables such as the minimal 
investment level I , the optimal investment level  
*I  , the interest rate of the 
capital market ER and the maximal unit returns of the project *R . There are 
also several exogenous parameters such as the mean wealth 
^
W  and the 
income difference X which is the difference between the poorest and the 
richest individual.. It is interesting to explore how these parameters influence 
endogenous variables. In this section, we will investigate the issue under the 
conditions of imperfect capital markets without banking. The restriction means 
the information on the return of project is private and entrepreneurs can 
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maximally collect E
l
R
 from the capital market. As Figure 2.3 shows, the 
individuals whose wealth is less than  ( ) ( ) ( )c E E E
lW R K I R
R
    cannot 
collect money to undertake the risky project. They will only be pure lenders. 
The individuals with wealth between ( )E E
lK I R
R
   and * ElK I R   
perform suboptimal investment and those with wealth higher than * E
lK I
R
   
carry out full investment. A few individuals who are richer will lend spare 
money after they have invested in the project. 
 
Therefore the expected credit supply is:  
*
( ) ( / )
*( ) ( ) ( )
E EK I R l R W
i i i i
W K I
Wg W dW W K I g W dW



 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
The first item covers individuals located in the area A of Figure 2.3. They have 
to invest in either the capital market or CRS. The second one involves the 
richer whose wealth exceeds the demand of a full investment project. They 
have to invest the rest of funds in other technologies. On the other hand, the 
expected demand of credits is: 
³³ 





*
*
*
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*
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)/()(
)()()()/(
IK
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ii
RlIK
RlRIK
i
E
E
E
EE
dWWgWIKdWWgRl  
The first item presents individuals who can maximally borrow ERl /  to invest 
the risky project at the suboptimal level. The second one exhibits individuals 
who are able to reach optimal investment level after borrowing iWIK  * .  
 
Lastly, we know the lowest interest rate must be no smaller than Z, otherwise 
all individuals would prefer to invest in CRS technology. On the other hand, the 
highest interest rate cannot be higher than *R , otherwise agents would never 
consider the risky technology. So the interest rate must vary from Z to *R . 
Which value the interest rate approaches is determined by different 
41 
 
parameters. There are three different circumstances. 
 
1) If ³³ 





*
*
*
)/(
*
)/(
)/()(
)()()()/(
IK
ZlIK
ii
ZlIK
ZlZIK
i dWWgWIKdWWgZl  
> @³³


 


W
IK
ii
ZlZIK
W
ii dWWgIKWdWWgW
*
)()()( *
)/()(
 then ZRE  .  
If the above inequality holds, there is an excess supply of funds because 
the proportion of projects that entrepreneurs are willing to invest in is less 
than the proportion of projects that lenders can support. One of restrictions 
of the model is the lowest interest rate must not be smaller than Z. The 
interest rate then declines to its minimal value Z. The spare funds flow to 
CRS technology. The share of entrepreneurs with suboptimal investment is 
³


)/(
)/()(
*
)(
ZlIK
ZlZIK
idWWg  . The proportion of individuals who invest at the optimal 
level is  ³


W
ZlIK
idWWg
)/(*
)( , . The total funds for CRS technology are the 
difference between the supply and the demand of credits. 
*
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Equilibrium of the model is determined by the following four equations. 
( ) (1 )
E
pf I p l
R
K I


                         (2.3) 
pIf /1)(' *                              (2.4) 
*
*
* )1()(
IK
lpIpfR 
                      (2.5) 
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ZRE                                  (2.15) 
 
There are four equations respond to four variables ER , I  , 
*I  and *R . 
Thus it should have a unique solution. However, we cannot obtain a 
reduced form solution on account of the general form of the product 
function. We¶ll discuss its comparative statics results instead. Chiang (1984) 
introduce a method called Derivatives of Implicit Functions to explore the 
comparative statics issue for those equations without reduced forms. In the 
following sections we are going to find out the results by the method. 
 
 Equation (2.15) says that the interest rate is a constant. Comparing it with 
(2.3) gives 
 
( ) (1 )pf I p l
Z
K I


                         (2.16) 
 
The minimal investment I  is determined by the equation above while the 
optimal investment *I  is determined by equation (2.4). Notice that neither 
the mean value of wealth 
^
W  nor the wealth difference X  are presented 
in the simultaneous equations. It implies that they do not affect ER  and *I . 
The reason is simple. No matter how 
^
W  and X  change, there is always 
an excess supply comparing to the demand as long as the inequality holds. 
The fundamental of the model never change in this case.  
 
In conclusion, the results of comparative statics are shown below: 
i. 
^
0
d I
d W
  ,  0d I
dX
  ; 
ii. 
*
^
0dI
d W
 ,  
*
0dI
dX
 ; 
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iii. 
^
0
EdR
d W
 ,  0
EdR
dX
 ; 
iv. 
*
^
0dR
d W
 ,  
*
0dR
dX
  
It states that both the average wealth and the difference of wealth do not 
change anything in this system, because they cannot change the 
fundamental fact of exceeding credits in this particular case. 
 
2) If > @³³³

 


!
W
IK
ii
RlIK
W
ii
IK
RlIK
ii dWWgIKWdWWgWdWWgWIK
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)()()()()( *
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*
  
then *RRE  . When the inequality holds, there is an excess demand of 
credits because the proportion of project that entrepreneurs are willing to 
invest is higher than the proportion of project that lenders can fund. The 
demand for funds pushes up the interest rate till *R , because the 
maximum of the interest rate cannot be larger than *R . In addition, 
comparing equation (2.3) with (2.5), it is easy to find that ** )( IRI    if 
*ER R . In other words, the minimal investment is equal to the optimal 
value as long as *RRE  . Those individuals who carry out suboptimal 
investment completely disappear. No one will invest in CRS technology 
either. The solution of the model is determined by the following five 
equations. 
( ) (1 )
E
pf I p l
R
K I


                          (2.3) 
pIf /1)(' *                                (2.4) 
*
*
* )1()(
IK
lpIpfR 
                       (2.5) 
** )( IRI                                  (2.17) 
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*RRE                                   (2.18) 
 
For the same reason, we only discuss its comparative statics results here. 
Firstly, according to (2.4) *I  is a constant in this case. It does not change 
any more, so does I  on account of (2.17). In addition, both 
^
W  and X  
are not shown in the simultaneous equations. It means they do not affect 
the equilibrium because they cannot change the fundamental fact of 
exceeding demand.  
 
In conclusion, the results of comparative statics are shown below: 
i. 
^
0
d I
d W
  ,  0d I
dX
  ; 
ii. 
*
^
0dI
d W
 ,  
*
0dI
dX
 ; 
iii. 
^
0
EdR
d W
 ,  0
EdR
dX
 ; 
iv. 
*
^
0dR
d W
 ,  
*
0dR
dX
  
 
The results show that both *I
 
and I  are fixed in this case. In addition, 
the interest rate and its maximal value are not affected by the mean wealth 
and indifference in wealth as well.. 
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then *RRZ E dd .  
 
The minimal supply of funds in the economy is 
*
( ) ( / )
*( ) [ ( )] ( )
K I Z l Z W
i i i i
W K I
Wg W dW W K I g W dW



 

  ³ ³  with ZRE   while the 
maximal supply of funds is 
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W K I
Wg W dW W K I g W dW
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with *RRE  . If the inequality holds, there is an excess demand of credits if 
ZRE  , and an excess supply of credits if *RRE  . Therefore the demand 
of credits varies in the range of the maximum and the minimum credits 
supply, and the interest rate ER  changes between Z  and *R . It 
approaches equilibrium at the market clear point, where the total demand is 
equal to the total supply. That is 
 
*
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   (2.19) 
 
The total proportion of projects funded at the optimal level is ³


W
RlIK
i
E
dWWg
/*
)( . 
The proportion of projects in the suboptimal status is ³


)/(
)/()(
*
)(
E
EE
RlIK
RlRIK
idWWg . 
Because the demand of funds is equal to the supply, the CRS investment 
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has no place in this case. The system is determined by the following 
equations 
 
( ) (1 )
E
pf I p l
R
K I


                                           (2.3) 
pIf /1)(' *                                                (2.4) 
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The results of comparative statics show below. The proof is in the Appendix 
A.1. Apparently, there are three different results depending on the value of 
*K I  and 2X. Here *K I  is the optimal investment level while X is the 
difference between the poorest and the richest individual. So * 2K I X   
point at an economy where the difference between the poorest and the richest 
is large and * 2K I X ! means the difference between the poorest and the 
richest is small.  
 
a) If * 2K I X  , then 
i. 
^
0
I
W
w !
w
, 0
I
X
w w ; 
ii. 
*
^
0I
W
w  
w
, 
*
0I
X
w  w ; 
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iii. 
^
0
ER
W
w 
w
, 0
ER
X
w w ; 
iv. 
*
^
0dR
d W
 ,  
*
0dR
dX
  
If the mean wealth increases, the minimal investment level goes up 
while the interest rate falls. The movement of the threshold ElK I R 
is ambiguous. But the second threshold * ElK I R   shift leftwards. If 
the difference X increases, both the minimal investment level and the 
interest rate decreases. Therefore the thresholds ElK I R   and 
*
E
lK I R   move towards left. The fixed set-up cost has a similar 
effect except that it also has a negative relation with the maximal return 
of the risky project. 
 
b) If * 2K I X  , then 
i. 
^
0
I
W
w  
w
, 0
I
X
w w ; 
ii. 
*
^
0I
W
w  
w
,
*
0I
X
w  w ; 
iii. 
^
0
ER
W
w  
w
, 0
ER
X
w w ; 
iv. 
*
^
0dR
d W
 ,  
*
0dR
dX
  
In this case, the mean wealth does not connect to the variables in the 
economy. The difference X and the fix cost K impose the same effects 
on the system as the previous case does. 
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c) If * 2K I X ! , then  
i. 
^
0
I
W
w 
w
, 0
I
X
w w ; 
ii. 
*
^
0I
W
w  
w
,
*
0I
X
w  w ; 
iii. 
^
0
ER
W
w !
w
, 0
ER
X
w w ; 
iv. 
*
^
0dR
d W
 ,  
*
0dR
dX
  
In this case, the mean wealth carry out an opposite effect to the 
economy comparing with the first case. The effects of the rest 
parameters are the same. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
We investigate a model of asymmetric information on account of market 
imperfection. The only heterogeneity over individuals is their initial 
endowments. According to their restrictions of working capital, individuals 
make investment decision among the capital market, the CRS technology and 
a risky project. We find that the poorest individuals are pure lenders. Some 
medium-wealth individuals borrow money to reach a sub-optimal investment 
level while a few richer individuals collect enough money to achieve the full 
investment level. The richest individuals are self-financing. We then introduce 
a monitoring technology to make it possible for external lenders observing the 
returns of the private project. Thus individuals have an alternative source to 
raise money. Our results show that the poorest individuals are still pure lenders, 
some relatively poor individuals may obtain bank loan to achieve the optimal 
level of investment. Meanwhile, some medium wealth individuals prefer to 
borrow from the capital market to remain at sub-optimal investment level and 
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some richer individuals raise necessary money from the direct finance source 
to achieve the full investment. The richest individuals are still self-finance. 
 
Finally, we carry out the comparative statics to the imperfect capital market 
model without banking. We find that if there is an excess supply of funds then 
the interest rate is equal to the CRS return. Neither the average wealth nor the 
difference of wealth affects the system in this case. Furthermore, if there is an 
excess demand of credits. Then the interest rate is equal to the optimal unit 
return. Both the optimal and minimal investments are fixed. In addition, the 
interest rate and its maximal value are not affected by either the mean wealth 
or indifference of wealth. Only if the demand of credits varies between the two 
supplies above, the interest rate changes accordingly between the CRS return 
and the optimal return. The comparative statics results depend on the 
difference between the optimal investment value and the income difference. 
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 CHAPTER 3  
THE EFFECT OF AVERAGE INCOME ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM INCOME INEQUALITY THRESHOLD REGRESSION  
 
ABSTRACT 
The relation among income inequality, economic growth and financial 
development has been highly controversial for a long time. Some researchers 
suggest that there is an inverted-U curve between income inequality and 
growth (Kuznets (1955), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Galor and Tsiddon (1996)). 
They believe that income inequality goes up at the earlier developing stages 
and falls as long as the economy is fully grown. However, some empirical tests 
do not support such processes (Clarke et al. (2003), Barro (2000)). 
Furthermore, most studies only focus on relations between either economic 
growth and income inequality, or between financial development and inequality. 
Little research goes further to explore the combined effects of economic 
growth and income inequality on financial development. In Chapter 2, we have 
developed a model to detect individualV¶ investment decisions, given the initial 
endowment and the distribution of wealth. In this chapter we discuss how 
average wealth affects financial development over the different values of 
income inequality. Both initial wealth and its distribution work together to 
determine the interest rate, the minimal investment level and consequently the 
size of the capital market. This chapter examines the impact of income 
inequality and average income on financial development by a threshold 
regression. The empirical tests observe two important results. One is that the 
rise of average income does improve financial development as long as income 
inequality is below a cut-off value. The other is that there is a strong threshold 
effect on income inequality. In other words, the effect of average income on 
financial development depends on the value of income inequality.  
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3.1 Introduction 
It¶s been a controversial issue about the relation among economic growth, 
financial development and income inequality. Some evidence shows that 
economic growth acts as a stimulus for financial development (Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990)). On the other hands, a lot of studies suggest that 
growth would push up income inequality firstly and pull it down later on 
(Kuznets (1955), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Galor and Tsiddon (1996)). 
However, little research explores the combined effect of economic growth and 
income inequality on financial development. In Chapter 2, we have developed 
a theoretical model to detect individuals¶ investment decisions under the 
different financial restrictions. In this chapter, we deliver a meaningful result 
that both average wealth and income inequality affect the way individuals 
accessing the financial market and consequently their loan sizes, namely 
financial development. Note it is not a dynamic model, so we cannot detect the 
relation between economic growth and financial development. Instead, the 
purpose of this chapter is to inspect how average income and income 
inequality influence financial development by carrying out an empirical 
threshold regression model.  
 
There is a famous inverted U-shape hypothesis Kuznets (1955) in the study of 
income inequality. In the seminal paper, Kuznets describes the transformation 
of an economy from agricultural society to industrial society and predicts an 
inverted-U shape relationship between income inequality and economic 
development. He suggests that income inequality will rise during the short term 
of the transition. As the economy grows, income inequality touches the ceiling 
and turns down in the long term. The process is shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV 
 
One possible interpretation is that physical capital is the major source to 
promote economic growth at the early stage of development. A wider income 
difference encourages growth by allocating credits towards those who save 
and invest the most. However, at the mature stage, the government 
redistributes income throughout different levels of society by retirement 
pension, health care and so on. Thus income inequality declines. Furthermore, 
human capital also accounts for growth at this stage because the promotion of 
mass education may also reduce the gap in income inequality.  
 
The interpretation implies that the financial system plays a key role in the 
process. Given the initial wealth distribution, only those individuals who have 
sufficient physical capital are able to raise fund from the capital market to earn 
a higher return and consequently benefit from financial development. In this 
case, income inequality will be magnified across different groups. In other 
words, financial development, coming with the capital market imperfection, 
makes income inequality worse at the early stages. As the financial system is 
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fully mature, however, market imperfection fades away and the capital market 
will be more equally shared over different groups. Therefore income inequality 
will decrease.  
 
In Chapter 2, we develop a theoretical model to examine how individuals 
choose investment method to maximize their returns, given the initial wealth 
distribution. The results of comparative statics show that there are threshold 
effects on the income difference between the rich and the poor. If the income 
difference is lower than the critical value, then the minimal investment level 
and the interest rate positively related to the average wealth. Otherwise both of 
them negatively linked to the average wealth. We know the income difference 
is somehow associated with income inequality. The minimal investment level 
and the interest rate also determine the size of financial sectors. Therefore the 
model predicts a relationship between financial development, average wealth 
and income inequality. The purpose of this chapter is to inspect the prediction 
by empirical data. The innovation of our empirical test is that we adopt the 
method of threshold regression to avoid two major problems from other 
researches. Firstly, we do not arbitrarily divide countries into groups such as 
developing or developed countries. Secondly, we also do not deliberately 
select the turning-point of the development. Within the method of threshold 
regression, the turning-point just emerges naturally. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review literature on the 
relationship between growth and inequality in section 2. In section 3, we recall 
the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 and make an empirical extension 
with the Gini coefficient. An empirical model is demonstrated in section 4. The 
data set is shown in section 5. Then we discuss the result in section 6. Finally 
we conclude in section 7. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
There are a large number of papers discussing the relationship between 
growth and income inequality. The famous controversial issue is tKH.X]QHW¶V
hypothesis (Kuznets (1955)). In his seminal paper, Kuznets describes a 
transformation of an economy from agricultural society to industrial society and 
predicted an inverted-U shape relationship between growth and income 
inequality. He suggests that the latter will rise at the initial stages of the 
transition and turns down after touching the ceiling in the long term. The 
argument is so prevalent that a lot of recent studies revolve around it. We list a 
few papers which accept or reject .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV in the table 3.1. 
 
Accept .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV Reject .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV 
Kuznets (1955) Saith (1983) 
Ahluwalia (1976a, 1976b) Barro (2000) 
Campano and Salvatore (1988) Clarke et al. (2003) 
Galor and Tsiddon (1996) Beck et al. (2004) 
Aghion and Bolton (1997) Andrews et al. (2009) 
Jalilian (2002)  
Table 3.1 
 
Aghion and Bolton (1997) developed a trickle-down growth and development 
model under the imperfect capital market circumstances. The model provided 
a mechanism of how the accumulation of wealth by the rich trickles down to 
the poor and makes the latter better off. The moral hazard with limited borrow 
constraint is the source of market imperfection and income inequality. This 
model set up a closed economy with continuum agents. Each agent lives for 
one period and leaves one child. At the beginning each agent is endowed with 
wealth randomly and one unit of labour. Then they work, invest, consume and 
bequeath. The only source of heterogeneity among them is the initial wealth 
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endowments. An agent can choose either to be a worker to have a 
deterministic but small income, or to be an entrepreneur to obtain a higher, but 
uncertain revenue. The interest rate is determined endogenously. The model 
confirmed the trickle-down process leads to a unique stable wealth distribution 
under sufficiently high rates of capital accumulation. But it didn't deny 
government intervention because the latter brings greater opportunity equality 
and also accelerates the trickle-down process. The most important result is 
that the process of capital accumulation increases income inequality initially 
but reduces it later. In other words, the theoretical model supports .X]QHW¶V
hypothesis. 
 
Another theoretical model which supports WKH.X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLVis provided 
by Galor and Tsiddon (1996). The model interprets the mechanism of the 
inverted U-shape relation between income inequality and per capita output 
from the perspective of the accumulation of human capital, instead of physical 
capital. It constructs a small overlapping-generations economy with perfect 
competition markets. An individual lives for three periods. Firstly he borrows 
money to invest in education for himself. After having professional skills, he 
then supplies inelastically efficiency units of labour and obtains wages at the 
competitive market in the second period. The third period is only for 
consumption. A single homogeneous good is produced by using capital and 
labour in every period. The level of the production technology is determined by 
the average level of human capital of the previous generation. They found the 
pursuit of equality at the early stage may trap the economy in a low level of 
investment in human capital. In contrast, inequality encourages highly 
educated families in society to get over the low level situation by increasing 
their investment in human capital. As such upper segments of society grow 
and income inequality becomes wider, the accumulated knowledge gradually 
trickles-down to the lower group in society and leads to the improvement of 
skills as well as the production technology. It finally improves human capital for 
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all segments of society and thus alleviates income inequality at the mature 
stage of the economy. The process obviously approves .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV. 
 
There are a lot of empirical evidences to support Kuznet¶s hypothesis too. 
Ahluwalia (1976a, 1976b) explored the nature of the relationship between 
economic growth and income inequality based on cross country data. He used 
a sample of 60 countries, including 40 developing countries, 14 developed 
countries and 6 socialist countries to examine the issue by multivariate 
regression. These 60 countries were deliberately divided into five different 
percentile groups, which are the top 20 percent, the middle 40 percent, the 
lowest 60 percent, the lowest 40 percent and the lowest 20 percent. The 
economic growth is indicated by the logarithm of per capita GNP. There is also 
a dummy variable to distinguish socialist countries from the sample because of 
the expectation of higher degree of equality for those countries. These five 
percentile segments produce five basic equations. The result of the empirical 
test for a quadratic relationship between the logarithm of per capita GNP and 
income inequality is significant. All five equations yields ³FRUUHFW´ VLJQV DQG
relatively strong t-tests and coefficients of determination which consist with 
.X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLVAs a matter of fact, income shares of all groups except 
the top 20 percentile declined firstly and then increased as per capita GNP 
rose.  
 
Campano and Salvatore (1988) re-examine the inverted U-shaped hypothesis 
between growth and inequality with the similar method of the previous study . 
Their initial motivation is to defend Ahluwalia (1976b) against Saith (1983) 
because the latter denies the former's empirical results. Saith indicates that the 
estimated parameters of the bottom group income share are unstable and 
statistically insignificant when the dummy variable is omitted, or the socialist 
countries are removed from the sample, or the estimation includes only the 
developing countries. Campano argues that there are five basic equations in 
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the Ahluwalia's test. Exclusive selection for only one of the equations makes 
Saith¶s conclusion weak. Though sometimes the bottom 20 percent of the 
population seems to be ignored by the development, other segments of the 
society are significantly affected by the process. It shows that the result is 
robust. Campano hence repeats the Ahluwalia's test with new data. His 
sample set contains 95 countries including 68 developing countries, 21 
developed countries and 6 socialist countries. The results again supported  
Kuznet's hypothesis for the whole population. Furthermore, Jalilian (2002) 
reports an empirical result based on panel data of 64 countries which are 
composed of 43 developing and 21 developed countries. His results exhibit a 
strong support to Kuznets' inverted-U hypothesis. 
 
However, there are many dissenting voices on this issue. Clarke et al. (2003) 
examines the relation between financial development and income inequality 
with panel data of 91 countries over the period 1960-1995. They predict 
financial development affects income inequality as long as agents migrate 
from the traditional sector to the modem one. If an individual can easily access 
the capital market, he can make the transition faster. Since the modern sector 
garners larger rewards for its participants, it means highly talented individuals 
must gain more than others. Consequently inequality will be expected higher in 
countries with large modern sectors and financial intermediaries. In other 
words, the relation between financial development and the size of the modern 
sector would be positive. Based on the analysis above, they construct an 
empirical model including linear and squared terms of the log of real per capita 
GDP, linear and squared terms of financial sectors and a product term of 
financial development and modern sector to detect their relationship. Their 
result shows that there is a negative relationship between the financial sector 
and income inequality. In other words, they didn't find the significant evidences 
to support the inverted U-shaped curve from .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV. 
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Barro (2000) argues that there are little overall relation between inequality and 
growth. His empirical framework is based on conditional convergence. It 
considers average growth rates and average ratios of investment to GDO over 
three decades, 1965-75, 1975-85, and 1985-95. The estimation is applied by 
three-stage least squares. He also tests many control variables such as 
government consumption to GDP, the rule of law, an index of democracy, and 
the rate of inflation. He finds that the effect of log form of GDP on growth is 
negative for all but the poorest countries. It also negatively relates to the ratio 
of government consumption to GDP. On the other hands, growth is positively 
related to the stock of human capital. It also positively relates to the ratio of 
investment to GDP. This result shows that the effect of inequality on growth is 
negative for values of per capita GDP below $2070 (1985 U.S. dollars) and 
then becomes positive. AltKRXJK .X]QHW¶V K\SRWKHVLV PD\ EH DQ HPSLULFDO
regularity, he disputed that it cannot explain variations in inequality across 
countries or over time. 
 
Beck et al. (2004) use the data set of 52 developing and developed countries 
over the period 1960 to 1999 to examine the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. They find that financial development 
induced income inequality to fall and reduce poverty.  The result didn¶t 
support the Kuznets¶ hypothesis either. The above arguments show there is no 
convincing evidence to support a certain relationship between growth and 
income inequality. It is necessary to explore the issue further. 
 
In addition, there are some other papers which check the relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth from different perspectives. For 
instance, Bornschier (1983) analyzes two paradigms of the income inequality. 
The one is µWKH ZRUOG HFRQRP\¶ paradigm and the other is 'the level of 
development' paradigm. The former could be regarded as globalization. It 
means the global economy allocates labour within industrial activities, and he 
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analyzed inequality in a global view rather than a single country. The latter is 
the normal nexus between growth and income inequality across countries. 
One of his conclusions is that developing countries do not automatically lower 
their inequality in development. The reason is that the position of countries in 
the world economy seems to stabilize income inequality differences between 
these groups of countries. Under these circumstances, developing countries 
generally cannot be expected to reduce income inequality substantially with 
economic growth. Durlauf and Johnson (1995) use a method called 
µregression trees¶ for structural-break and threshold identification. He found the 
marginal product of capital varies on account of the level of economic 
development. The results are consistent with ours in which economic growth 
exhibit multiple stages. Another paper evaluate the impact of financial 
development on changes in the distribution of income and changes in both 
relative and absolute poverty (Andrews et al. (2009)). They use a panel of tax 
data of 12 developed nations observed for between 22 and 85 years. Their 
results show that there is no systematic relationship between top income 
shares and economic growth. 
 
No matter whether these empirical results support or reject .X]QHW¶V
hypothesis, two major problems may weaken their conclusions. Firstly, most 
studies divide countries into two groups (developed and less developed). An 
implied meaning of it is that the nature of the relationship differs according to a 
country¶s level of economic development. It is important to note, however, that 
the criterion to which groups a country belongs depends on a researcher ¶s 
subjective category. Secondly, the form of the empirical model has 
considerable impact on the turning-point of the curve. The U-shape hypothesis 
in turns may be significant for some functional forms and not for others. For 
example, while Deininger and Squire (1998) UHMHFWWKH.X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLVIRU
the fixed-effects case, they do find it survived in the pooled case for their 
functional form. Therefore we prefer a more natural method for the empirical 
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model to a specified function form. The threshold model which is developed by 
Hansen (1999) is attractive because it allows more flexible regression 
functional forms by splitting data with unknown threshold values. However, 
Hansen¶s model is only effective for the exogenous threshold variables. The 
endogeneity problem for the threshold variables may causes coefficients 
estimators being inconsistent and consequently the inference is invalid. 
Fortunately, there is an extended framework which allows the endogenous 
threshold variables (Kourtellos et al. (2008), Wang and S.Lin (2010)). We will 
employ the endogenous threshold regression in our empirical test. 
 
3.3 The Model Framework 
In Chapter 2, we assumes that there is a continuum of risk-neutral agents of 
measure 1 who indexed by i . A single good can be either invested or 
consumed. An individual is initially endowed with a random wealth iW , 
[ , ]iW W W


 . Suppose the endowment is subjected to a continuous uniform 
distribution. Hence the cumulative distribution function is  
( ) i
W W
G W
W W



 

 
and the corresponding density function is  
1( )g W
W W


 

. 
In addition, the mean wealth of the economy is  
^
( )
2
W
i i
W
W W
W Wg W dW




  ³                      (3.1) 
Let 
^ ^
W W W W X


    . Then  
2
W W
X


 
                                  
(3.2) 
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Parameter X is half of the income difference from the richest to the poorest in 
the economy. Consequently the range of endowment can be presented by 
^ ^
[ , ]iW W X W X   . The system contains three different investment 
technologies. The first one is a CRS technology that yields a constant return 
Z(>1) for each unit input. This technology is a riskless way to invest. Another 
choice is to invest in the capital market and earn ER (>1). Here the interest 
rate ER  is endogenously determined. The third method is the most 
complicated one. There is a project requiring a fixed cost K(>0) at the 
beginning of the period. Suppose iI  is the investment variable of the project 
for an individual i , [0, )iI W K
  . The total investment of an agent is iK I . It 
yields ( )if I  once the project succeeds with probability p , or fails with 
probability 1 p  and is thus liquidated with the value l ( l K ).  Here we 
assume '( ) 0, "( ) 0i if I f I!   as usual.  
 
We have demonstrated in Chapter 2 that the model has many important 
features. Firstly, the maximal investment of the project, *I , is determined by 
the equation pIf /1)(' *  . Secondly, due to the reason of moral hazard, a 
lender maximally provides El R  to a borrower. Hence the minimal investment 
value I  is obtained by the equation ( ) [ ( ) ]
E
E
lR K I p f I lR     . It means 
that an individual is indifferent to invest in either the capital market or the risky 
project at the minimal investment level. Simplifying the equation obtains  
( ) (1 )
E
pf I p l
R
K I


                         (3.3) 
 
The model is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 
 
Variables 
_
I  and ER  are endogenously determined in the model, while 
_
, , ,K l W W

 are exogenous parameters. Because *I  is given by the equation 
pIf /1)(' *  , it is an exogenous parameter as well. 
  
Since the purpose of this chapter is to verify the model with the empirical 
experiment, the question is what the model predicts and how to test it. We will 
discuss these issues in detail in the following sections. 
 
First of all, the expression 
^
( )
W
i i
W
W Wg W dW


 ³  states that ^W  is the average 
wealth (also the average income) of an economy. It is easily mapped to GDP 
per capita in a data set. Let¶s examine how parameter X relates to income 
inequality. 
 
We measure income inequality by the Gini coefficient which applies ratio 
analysis. The simplicity of the Gini coefficient makes it easy to compare across 
countries and to interpret. Hence it is prevalent in the study of income 
inequality. The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve which indicates 
the ratio of the incomes of the bottom proportion of all households to the total 
incomes, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
63 
 
 
Figure 3.3 
Technically, the Gini index presents the ratio of the area that lies between the 
line of equality and the Lorenz curve over the total area under the line of 
equality. In other words, AGini
A B
  . Since A+B = 0.5, the Gini index 
2 1 2Gini A B   . Note instead of being someone wealth value, B is the 
integral of Lorenz curve form 0 to1. It is strictly positive. It is not so If the Lorenz 
curve is presented by the function ( )L W , the value of B can be obtained by 
1
0
( ) iL W dW³ . According to the definition of Lorenz curve, it has 
22
2
2
( )
( )
( )
i
i
W i
W iW
i iW i
W W i
i i iW W
W dW
Wg W dW W W W W
L W
W W WWg W dW dW
W W


 
 

 

 

    


³³
³ ³
           (3.4) 
64 
 
So  
2 22
1 1
2 20 0 2 2
1 3
( ) ( )
3( )
i
i i
W W W
B L W dW dW
W W W W
 
 
 
    
 
³ ³             (3.5) 
The area of B must be strictly positive. We know that 
2
23( ) 0W W


 ! , hence  
21 3 0W

 ! . The inequality puts a restriction on the lowest wealth. 
 
Assumption 1 : 10
3
W

   
 
Therefore  
2
2
1
20 2
3( ) 2
1 2 1 2 ( )
3( )
i
W W
Gini B L W dW
W W




      

³            (3.6) 
Substituting X and 
^
W  into the equation above obtains 
2^
2
^
3( ) 1
6
W XGini
W X
                          (3.7) 
The equation indicates that income inequality relates to not only the gap 
between the rich and the poor, but also the social mean wealth.  
 
The result of the comparative statics in Chapter 2 is 
a) If 
*
2
K IX  , then 
^
0
I
W
w !
w
,  
^
0
ER
W
w !
w
 
b) If 
*
2
K IX  , then 
^
0
I
W
w  
w
, 
^
0
ER
W
w  
w
 
c) If 
*
2
K IX ! , then 
^
0
I
W
w 
w
, 
^
0
ER
W
w 
w
 
Such result is not suitable for examined by the empirical data directly for 
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several reasons. Firstly, X presents the income difference between the rich 
and the poor. It is an unobservable parameter. Secondly, it is also not a proper 
proxy for income inequality. The high income inequality may occur in either a 
poor country or a rich country. So we need a much measurable observation to 
replace it. Since the Gini coefficient is a function of X and 
^
W , we consider to 
include it in our empirical model. The previous boundary condition, 
*
2
K IX  , 
defines a threshold of income inequality such that we can obtain a relationship 
between income inequality and the mean wealth by substituting 
*
2
K IX   
for function (3.7). Finally we have a unique threshold of Gini coefficient (see 
Appendix C), that is  
2^
*
^ ^ ^
*
1( )
3
4 ( )
C
WK IGini
W K I W
 

                      (3.8) 
Consequently the results of the comparative static can be expressed as: 
a) If 
2^
*
^ ^ ^
*
1( )
3
4 ( )
WK IGini
W K I W
 

, then 
^
0
I
W
w 
w
, 
^
0
ER
W
w 
w
 (3.9)  
b) If 
2^
*
^ ^ ^
*
1( )
3
4 ( )
WK IGini
W K I W
 

, then 
^
0
I
W
w  
w
, 
^
0
ER
W
w  
w
 (3.10)  
c) If 
2^
*
^ ^ ^
*
1( )
3
4 ( )
WK IGini
W K I W
! 

, then 
^
0
I
W
w !
w
, 
^
0
ER
W
w !
w
 (3.11)  
 
Let¶s check what financial sectors happened as the minimal investment level 
and the interest rate changes. The total borrowing (See Appendix B.2)  
indicates the size of the financial sectors. It equals the sum of the area B and C 
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in Figure 3.2: 
 
Total Borrowing=
*( )
2
2
E
E
ll I I
R
R X
 
                        (3.12) 
 
The income difference X is constant in equation (3.12) when we discuss the 
effect of changing the average wealth 
^
W on the total borrowing. Suppose both 
the minimal investment level I  and the interest rate 
ER  increase, the 
denominator goes up while the numerator falls. Thus the total borrowing, i.e 
the size of the capital market, shrinks correspondingly. On the contrary, if both 
the two variables decrease, the total borrowing increases. In other words, the 
financial system is expanding. The first case relates to inequality (3.9), and the 
second one relates to inequality (3.11). The result of the comparative static 
hence illustrates that financial development benefits from income growth if the 
Gini coefficient is lower than the threshold. Once the Gini coefficient exceeds a 
particular cut-off value, it brings about negative effects on the financial system.  
 
To conclude, our model predicts the following result: 
^
0FD
W
w t
w
, if 
2^
*
^ ^ ^
*
1( )
3
4 ( )
WK IGini
W K I W
d 

               (3.13) 
^
0FD
W
w 
w
, if 
2^
*
^ ^ ^
*
1( )
3
4 ( )
WK IGini
W K I W
! 

               (3.14) 
 
The inequality (3.13) states that capital markets will benefit from the growth of 
average income if the income inequality is lower than a particular cut-off value. 
It will be worse off with the increase of average income if the income inequality 
exceeds the threshold. Such a conclusion coheres with the result of 
comparative static in Chapter 2. Suppose, for example, there is a very poor 
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economy with low income inequality. Due to a lack of credits, the projects that 
the capital market can support are less than they needed. There is an excess 
demand on credits in the economy. It therefore has the highest borrowing cost, 
that is *ER R . This is the second situation of Chapter 2. In this case, some 
extra wealth added to the system will alleviate the pressure of requirements for 
credits and drop the interest rate from *R  to ER . Meanwhile the minimal 
investment level declines too. Consequently a critical boundary, ElK I R  , 
moves leftwards and hence capital markets is expanded. Some individuals 
prefer to be entrepreneurs rather than pure workers since the risky project can 
bring in more returns. This situation is the third case of Chapter 2. In other 
words, a rising average wealth leads to the expanding capital markets if the 
income distributes properly. By contrast, if the income inequality is higher than 
the cut-off value, it means the income distribution is totally distorted and it may 
be harmful to the economy. For instance, suppose the rich have the major 
wealth, an increment of wealth just output a few credits supply whereas it may 
create much demand²those pure workers who are recently qualified to select 
the risky project need at least El R  capital. Therefore the demand for credits 
exceeds its supply. Both the interest rate and the minimal invest level rise to 
balance the demand and supply. Thus the size of capital markets eventually 
shrinks.  
 
In conclusion, financial development must be positively related to average 
wealth if the income inequality is small while it is negatively related to average 
wealth if the income inequality is higher than the critical value. However, we 
would not expect to observe such simple relationship in the experiment for 
several reasons. Firstly, in order to simplify the model, we assume that income 
is subjects to a uniform distribution. It is not usual in the real world. Secondly, 
for the same reason, we didn¶t count in other factors which may affect income 
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often deliberately redistribute income over different social groups and 
decrease income inequality by taxation, subsidies and welfare benefits. These 
acts prevent income inequality from running too high and led to a sustainable 
growth. But our model still have a good interpretation power in such 
circumstances because we can expect to detect a strong threshold effect such 
that the increase of average income would distinctly stimulate financial 
development more in some segments of income inequality than others. 
 
3.4 The Panel Threshold Regression with Single Exogenous Threshold 
In this section we extend a model originally developed by Hansen (1999) who 
suggests a bootstrap procedure to estimate a threshold regression. He 
developed an asymptotic distribution theory for both the threshold parameter 
estimate and the regression slope coefficients. The TR model is given by 
'
, 1 , ,i t i t i ty x eE  , ,i tq Jd                          (3.15) 
'
, 2 , ,i t i t i ty x eE  , ,i tq J!                          (3.16) 
The model considers balanced panel data which are given by 
^ `, , ,, , :1 ,1i t i t i ty x q i n t Td d d d , where ,i ty  and ,i tq  are the dependent variable 
and a threshold variable, respectively, and 
,i tx  is a 1pu  vector of 
independent variables. The subscript i  indexes the individual and the 
subscript t  indexes time.  
 
The model can be written in a single equation form:  
' '
, 1 , , 2 , , ,( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i ty x I q x I q eE J E J d  !               (3.17) 
where ( )I   denotes the indicator function. Obviously, the observations are 
split into two groups which are distinguished by whether the threshold variable 
,i tq  is smaller or larger than the critical value J .  
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By defining ' ' '1 2( )E E E  and , ,,
, ,
( )
( ) ( )
i t i t
i t
i t i t
x I q
x
x I q
JJ J
d­° ® !°¯ , a more compact form is 
'
, , ,
( )i t i t i ty x eE J                             (3.18) 
 
Let these variables 
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, 
,2
,
i
i
i T
e
e
e
ª º« » « »« »¬ ¼
 
 indicate an individual¶s observations and errors with deleted one time period 
and let Y , ( )X J  and e  denote the data and errors for all individuals, then 
equation (3.18) obtains a form as 
( )Y X eJ E                              (3.19) 
To estimate such a TR model, Hansen provided Concentrated Least Squares 
(CLS) regressions based on a grid search over all threshold value 
1 2{ , ,..., }nTq q qJ  . Notice the cost of searching over values of J  is at most nT  
steps.  
For any given J , the equation (3.19) can be estimated by OLS. That is 
 ^ 1' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X X X YE J J J J                 (3.20) 
The vector of regression residuals is  
^ ^
( ) ( ) ( )e Y XJ J E J   
And the sum of squared errors is  
^ ^
'
1( ) ( ) ( )S e eJ J J                           (3.21) 
Hence the least squares estimators of J  is  
^
1arg min ( )SJJ J                           (3.22) 
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Once 
^
r  is obtained, the slope coefficient estimate is 
^ ^ ^
( )E E J . The residual 
vector is 
^ ^ ^
( )e e J  and residual variance is 
2 '^ ^ ^ ^
1
1 1 ( )( 1) ( 1)e e Sn T n TV J                 (3.23) 
 
3.5 The Panel Threshold Regression with Single Endogenous Threshold 
 
Hansen¶s model virtually imposes the assumption of the threshold variables 
being exogenous. In our case, however, according to inequality (3.13) and 
(3.14) the threshold variable Gini is a function of the average income ^W . It 
implies that the indicator ( )I   in equation (3.17) is a dynamic function. Hence 
there is obviously an endogeneity problem for threshold variables and it 
causes coefficients estimators being inconsistent. Consequently the inference 
developed by Hansen is invalid in our model. Looking into details of the 
method, we find that the point is how to produce corrected sum of squared 
errors which get rid of the endogeneity effect. Fortunately, there is an extended 
framework which allows  an endogenous threshold variable (Kourtellos et al. 
(2008), Wang and S.Lin (2010)). The method is shown below. 
 
If we allow an endogenous threshold for equation (3.17), the model is modified 
as  
' '
, 1 , , 2 , , ,( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i ty x I q x I q eE J E J d  !   
'
, , ,i t i t i tq z uS                              (3.24) 
where 
, 1, 2,i t it itz z zª º ¬ ¼  contains the instrument variable and 2it itz x . The 
equation (3.24) describes the mechanism that generates an exogenous 
threshold variable.  
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Then we carry out three steps of Concentrated Two-Stage Least Squares 
Method (C2SLS) to obtain the consistent estimations. 
z Step 1: We estimate the parameter S  in  equation (3.24) by OLS. 
z Step 2: We then estimate the threshold parameter J  by minimizing a 
C2SLS criterion using 
^S  obtained from the first step. 
 *
2
^
, , , 1 , , 2 , ,
1 1
( ), ( ),
arg min ( ) ( ) ( , , )
n i
N T
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
S
y x I q x I q q z
E J U J J
J E J E \ J S
  
§ ·  d  ! ¨ ¸© ¹¦¦
  (3.25) 
z Step 3: we estimate the least square coefficient parameters 
^
1E  and 
^
2E  
based on 
^J  
 
The 
^
, ,
( , , )i t i tq z\ J S  in step 2 is constructed by 
, , 1 , , 2 , ,( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i tq z z I q z I q\ J S UO J S J UO J S J  d   !    (3.26) 
Where U  is the covariance between 
,i te  and ,i tu . 
,
1 ,
,
( )( ) ( )
i t
i t
i t
z
z
z
I J SO J S M J S
     
,
2 ,
,
( )( )
1 ( )
i t
i t
i t
z
z
z
I J SO J S M J S
      
Here 1 ,( )i tzO J S  and 2 ,( )i tzO J S  are the well-known inverse Mills, which 
play the key role to correct the biased terms. Note if 0U   then the bias 
correction items will disappear and we get Hansen¶s threshold regression for 
exogenous threshold models. It implies that the Hansen¶s model is a special 
case of a general one. If we substitute the corrected threshold parameter 
^J  
from the equation (3.25) for the Hansen¶s counterpart, his inference is still valid. 
So we will adopt the corrected threshold parameter 
^J  in the rest part of this 
chapter. 
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3.6 The Panel Threshold Regression with Double Endogenous 
Thresholds Model 
The Model (3.24) only has a single threshold. It is possible to have multiple 
thresholds. The double threshold model takes the form as 
' ' '
, 1 , , 1 2 , 1 , 2 3 , 2 , ,( ) ( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ty x I q x I q x I q eE J E J J E J d   d     
'
, , ,i t i t i tq z uS                              (3.27) 
Where the thresholds are sorted so that 1 2J J . We will focus on the 
double-threshold model because the higher-order one can be extended 
straightforwardly from it. Hansen provides with an effective way to find out the 
solution.13  
z Step 1: Let 1( )S J  be the single threshold sum of squared errors as 
defined in (3.25) and let ^ 1J  be the threshold estimate which minimizes 
1( )S J . 
z Step 2: Fixing the first-stage estimate 
^
1J , the second-stage threshold 
estimate is 
2
^
2 2 2arg min ( )
r
rS
J
J J . 
z Step 3: Fixing the second-stage estimate 
^
2
r
J , the refinement estimate 
1
^
1 1 1arg min ( )
r
rS
J
J J  
The first step estimate 
^
1J  will be consistent for either 1J  or 2J  (Bai (1997), 
Bai and Perron (1998)). It can be used to find out the second step estimate ^ 2
r
J  
which is asymptotically efficient (Bai (1997)). The asymptotic efficiency of ^ 2
r
J  
                                                             
13
 Note we adopt the corrected threshold parameter 
^J  here so that the Hansen¶s 
method is still valid to the endogenous threshold case. 
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suggests that 
^
1J  can be refined through the third-stage estimation. Finally the 
refinement estimator 
^
1
r
J  at the last step is also asymptotically efficient (Bai 
(1997)). 
 
3.7 Determining Number of Thresholds 
An important hypothesis for our test is whether the TR model is statistically 
significant against a simple linear specification. In the model (3.27), there are  
no thresholds, or one threshold, or two thresholds. 
 
Firstly, OHW¶V examine no thresholds against one threshold. The null hypothesis 
of no threshold effect in (3.27) can be represented by: 
0 1 2:H E E  
Under the null hypothesis, it is difficult to implement such a test because the 
threshold parameter J  is not defined. Hansen introduces a 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier (LM) boostrap procedure to 
test the null hypothesis of a linear specification against a TR (Hansen (1999)). 
His method is below. 
 
Under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the model is  
'
, 1 , ,i t i t i ty x eE                        (3.28) 
The coefficient parameter 1E  is estimated by OLS, yielding estimate 
~
1E , 
residuals 
~
,i te  and sum of squared errors 
'
~ ~
, ,0 i t i tS e e . Therefore the likelihood 
ratio test of 0H  is  
^
0 1
1 2^
( )S SF J
V
                         (3.29) 
where 
^
1( )S J  is defined in (3.25) and 
2^V  can be computed by (3.23). Under 
the null hypothesis , it is a linear model and the endogeneity problem of the 
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threshold parameters does not exist. Furthermore, 
^
1( )S J  is defined in (3.25) 
which derive from the unbiased threshold parameters. Consequently, the test 
is still valid though it comes from Hansen¶s model. 
 
Since J  is not identified under the null hypothesis, the p  values are derived 
from a fixed bootstrap method. In this case, treat the regressors 
,i tx  and the 
threshold variable 
,i tq  as given, the bootstrap-dependent variable is 
generated from 
2^
,(0, )i tN e . Hansen shows that this procedure yields 
asymptotically correct p  values. The null of no threshold effect is rejected if 
the p  values are smaller than the desired critical value.  
 
If 1F  rejects the null of no threshold, we need a further test to discriminate 
between one and two thresholds. The approximate likelihood ratio test of one 
versus two thresholds can be based on a very similar statistic 
^ ^
21 1 2
2 2^
( ) ( )
r
rS SF J J
V
  
Where the variance estimate 
^
2^
22 ( )
( 1)
r
rS
n T
JV   . The hypothesis of one threshold is 
rejected in favor of two thresholds if 2F  is large. It is worth reminding that we 
adopt 
^
1 1( )S J , instead of 
^
11 ( )
r
rS J ,  in the 2F  statistic because the current null 
hypothesis of one threshold does not need a refinement estimate. This test 
can be extended in a straightforward manner to a higher order model. 
 
3.8 The Data 
In order to meet the requirements of the threshold regression for balanced 
panel data, we find out 16 countries with continuous data over the period from 
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1989 to 2004 year by year. Only these countries contain full data which can be 
applied threshold regression. They are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. Further research 
might cover more countries to obtain robust if the data is available. 
 
The primary measure of financial development is 'private credit', which is 
defined as private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions over GDP. This measure excludes credits issued by the central 
bank and development bank. It also excludes credits to the public sector. 
Therefore the measure directly present credits from savers to private firms. 
The data comes from the World Bank Financial Infrastructure database (Beck 
et al. (1999)).  
 
Secondly, the measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient that we have 
shown previously. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the 
Lorenz curve, which is the proportion of population against the income share 
received, and the line of equality over the total area under the line of equality. It 
ranges from 0 to 1. A lower Gini coefficient presents a more equal environment 
while higher Gini coefficient indicates more inequality. The data come from 
World Income Inequality Database UNU-WIDER (2008). In addition, the model 
also includes the real gross domestic product per capita with constant price as 
the average income data. The original data of income comes from Heston et al. 
(2009).  
 
Finally, the test also includes some usual control variables used in the 
literature on finance and growth and inequality such as trade openness, 
government consumption and real inflation (King and Levine (1993), Beck et al. 
(2000), Clarke et al. (2003)). Trade openness is the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP. Recent research shows that it has a positive impact 
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on financial development in economies (Baltagi et al. (2009), Demetriades and 
Rousseau (2010)). Government consumption was collected by government 
expenditure as a share of GDP. It has different effects on different stage of 
economy. For example, Demetriades and Rousseau (2010) demonstrate the 
evidence of a panel of 82 countries that government expenditure have positive 
effects on financial development for countries that are in the middle ranges of 
economic development, while it has little effect for poor countries and a 
strongly negative effect for the rich ones. Our data set include 16 countries 
which are in different development stages. Therefore the final impact of 
government spending is ambiguous. Both trade openness and government 
consumption are come from World Income Inequality Database UNU-WIDER 
(2008).  
 
At last, we use inflation as the instrument variable for Gini coefficient because 
higher levels of inflation tend to increase inequality in an economy, while it 
does not correlate with real GDP per capital. The data comes from the World 
BankBank (2009). Details of these measures are given in Table 3.3 of 
Appendix C.3. 
 
3.9 The Empirical Threshold Model 
(3.13) and (3.14) tell us there are strong threshold effects between financial 
development and average income. Some range of the Gini coefficient might be 
cumbersome for the economy while other optimum values may lead to a boom 
in financial markets. So we will test the following equations  
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
2 , 1 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 , 1 2 ,
( )
( ) ( )
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
FD Trade Gov GDP I Gini
GDP I Gini GDP I Gini e
D T T E J
E J J E J
   
   
    d
  d  !      (3.30) 
and 
, 1 11 , 1 21 , 1 22 , 1 , 1i t i t i t i t i tGini z Inflation z Trade z Gov u                 (3.31) 
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These variables are also used by Nandi (2008). Because the investment 
decision of the model is made at the beginning of the period, we make one 
year lag for all independent variables. There are also the additional regressors 
, 1i tTrade  , , 1i tGov  . They can be viewed as a special case of the model by 
constraining the slope coefficients on these variables to be the same in the two 
regimes. Hence they have no effect on the distribution theory. In addition, the 
effect of gini coefficient on average income might be nonlinear. Before the 
experiment we cannot confirm how many thresholds there are. Here we 
assume there are two threshold values. We will test the assumption 
afterwards. 
 
Test for Threshold Effects 
 
Single Threshold 
1F  
Double Threshold 
2F  
Triple Threshold 
3F  
iF  51.943 104.659 36.306 
p-Values 0.03 0.001 0.107 
Table 3.2: Tests for Threshold Effects 
 
Our approach allows for zero, one, two and three thresholds. The test statistics 
F1, F2 and F3, along with their bootstrap p-values, are displayed in Table 3.1. 
We find that the single threshold F1 is statistically significant with the bootstrap 
p-values of 0.03. It means the null hypothesis of no threshold effect is rejected 
at 5 percent level. In other words, model (3.30) has at least one threshold. We 
then need to test two thresholds against a single threshold. The test for double 
threshold F2 is strong significant with the bootstrap p-values of 0.001. On the 
other hand, the triple threshold F3 is not statistically significant with a bootstrap 
p-value of 0.107. The result gives a strong support to two thresholds model in 
the regression. Therefore expression (3.30) is a suitable form for the test.  
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The point estimates of the two thresholds are 36.6 and 37.663, respectively. 
Table 3.2 reports the regression slope estimates and their stand errors. 
 
Regression Estimates 
Regressor Coefficient Estimate 
GDP per Capita( 36.6Gini d ) 0.000024 
(0.000006) 
GDP per Capita(36.6 37.663Gini d ) 0.000041 
(0.000010) 
GDP per Capita(37.663 Gini ) 0.000025 
(0.000006) 
 
Table 3.3 Regression Estimates: Double Threshold Model 
 
Our major interest is how the real GDP per capita affects financial 
development through Gini thresholds. According to (3.13) and (3.14), we 
intuitively expect that average income is positively related to financial 
development when the Gini coefficient is small and the relationship becomes 
negative once the Gini coefficient is higher than the critical value. However, we 
do not observe such opposite signal in table 3.3. It is easy to understand 
because the prediction from the empirical model is restricted by a few 
assumptions. It usually does not happen in the real world. We normally 
observe a slide of financial markets on account of a business cycle or 
economic depression. It is unusual to find the collapse of capital markets 
caused by high income inequality, because most governments would try to 
redistribute wealth over different social groups by taxation, subsidy policies 
and social welfare etc. These actions effectively reduce income inequality in an 
economy. Therefore in the empirical test we do not expect exactly opposite 
signals of GDP per Capita with regards to different Gini thresholds. Instead, we 
focus on whether there is significant evidence to support threshold effects. If 
threshold effects take place then our prediction is still hold.  
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Since real GDP per capita is a very tiny scale comparing to credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector, these 
coefficient estimates are also small. Table 3.2 indicates two major results. One 
is that GDP per capita is positively related to financial development, namely 
private credit in our experiment. The other is that average income improves 
financial development with different slope values (the slope coefficient) 
through income inequality. For example, suppose there is 1 percent increase 
in real GDP per capita. If the Gini coefficient of an economy is lower than 36.6, 
it brings about 0.0024 percent increase in private credit. If the Gini coefficient 
locates between 36.6 and 37.663, the result nearly doubles than the former. If 
the Gini is higher than 37.663, the slope coefficient falls to the level of 0.0025. 
The case reveals a fact that there is an optimal Gini coefficient interval for 
financial development. Any values of Gini coefficient which is out of this range 
would be a cumbersome to the economy. This result has an intuitive 
interpretation. A low Gini coefficient might implies severe wealth redistribution 
by governments. Individuals thus lose motivation to make more money 
because of heavy taxes. By contrast, a high Gini coefficient means the rich 
take major part of the social wealth. It prevents people from starting a business 
because individuals will find either it is difficult to raise necessary money or the 
cost is very expensive. Therefore an economy would benefit from the suitable 
Gini coefficient.  
 
There are also two limitations on the empirical test. Firstly, these coefficients 
might be too small to be of interest. For example, it states that a 1 percent 
increase in real GDP per capita improves private credit by 0.0024 per cent. It is 
because real GDP per capita is too tiny scale to private credit. However, if we 
change the measurement, for example, using log(GDP) instead of GDP, the 
meaning of the estimated equation cannot fit to the empirical model. If a further 
research modifies the model to substituting real GDP for real GDP per capita, it 
would be better. Secondly, the interval between two thresholds is too narrow, 
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i.e from 36.6 to 37.6. It also makes the result weak in robust. If we can obtain 
balance data from more countries and longer time in the future, we can 
examine its robust again. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This paper examines the comparative static results of the previous chapter 
with an empirical model. The former states that if income difference across 
social groups is lower than a threshold, a rise in average income would push 
up the minimal investment level and the interest rate. Otherwise it would 
reduce both of them. Our empirical model develops further to predict that 
financial development must be positively related to average income if income 
inequality is small, while it is negatively related to average income if income 
inequality is higher than the critical value. We adopt a modified method of the 
multiple thresholds regression to the model in order to inspect this prediction. 
 
The empirical tests are applied to a panel of 16 countries for the period 
1989-2004. We find overwhelming evidence of the threshold effect. The point 
estimates of the two thresholds are 36.6 and 37.663 respectively. It means 
when income inequality is lower than 37.663, a rise of average income would 
improves financial development. As long as income inequality is higher than 
this value, financial development does not benefit from average income. Our 
results do not report any evidence to support .X]QHW¶VK\SRWKHVLV because we 
do not examine how economic growth determines income inequality. However, 
we cannot reject it as well because the results shows a high income inequality 
indeed hinders further growth.  
 
Several extensions of our methods would be desirable. Firstly, with the 
restriction of the balanced panel data set we have to ignore some samples, 
especially those countries which do not have continuous Gini data. A larger 
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size of samples may improve the results. Secondly, the model can be 
extended to a dynamic model to contain economic growth in future research. 
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CHAPTER 4  
OCCUPATION CHOICE AND INVESTMENT DECISION 
WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
Abstract 
We present a static model of an economy where individuals are 
heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth and there are credit constraints. 
Individuals are endowed with time resource which they can allocate between 
working and leisure to maximize their utility. What¶s more, individuals can 
choose to either sell their labour in the labour market or self-employ. Put 
differently, depending on the opportunity costs of alternatives, they can supply 
as pure wage workers or become entrepreneurs by running a risky project. 
Workers receive fixed wages while entrepreneurs receive risky profits. 
Individuals make their decisions on whether to be wage workers or 
entrepreneurs by comparing the utility from the wage work with that from the 
risky project. The endogenous interest rate adjusts to the point where the 
supply of credits is equal to the demand for funds while the wage rate meets 
the labour market clearing condition. We find that an increase in the mean 
wealth leads to a decrease in the interest rate. In equilibrium, the wage rate 
rises and so does the labour time. Meanwhile, both the optimal amount of 
labour and the minimal requirement of labour of the project decrease.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The famous Modigliani and Miller (1958) hypothesis states that given certain 
conditions (for instance, perfect capital markets, no agency costs or moral 
hazard), the market value of a firm is not affected by its financial structure. In 
other word, it implies that capital structure is of no importance for production, 
employment and investment decisions. However, recent empirical evidence by 
Wadhwani (1986, 1987), Nickell and Wadhwani (1988, 1991) and Nickell and 
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Nicolitsas (1999) suggest that financial factors are important determinants of 
employment in the UK. These results conflict with the µindependence¶ and 
µirrelevance¶ assumption of the M-M theorem. But they are not surprising 
results because the M-M theorem is restricted to perfect markets conditions.  
In previous chapters, we have discussed the relations between financial 
structure and other factors in imperfect markets. For example, in Chapter 1 we 
have revealed the effect of heterogeneity in terms of initial wealth on 
investments decisions. We have also explored the empirical evidence of the 
effect on income inequality in Chapter 3. Both chapters concentrate only on 
capital markets. In this chapter, we will introduce a few new variables to cover 
the issue with both the capital market and the labour market. Our contribution 
is to examine the investment choice and activities of lenders and borrowers 
when both capital market and labour market co-existence. 
 
We present a static model of an economy where individuals are 
heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth and there are credit constraints due to 
asymmetric information. Individuals are also endowed with time resource 
which they can allocate between working and leisure to maximize their utility. 
What¶s more, individuals can choose to either sell their labour in the labour 
market or self-employ. Put differently, depending on the opportunity costs of 
alternatives, they can supply as pure wage workers or become entrepreneurs 
by running a risky project. Unlike the model in Chapter 2, the risky project 
requires both capital and labour inputs. Workers receive fixed wages while 
entrepreneurs receive risky profits. Individuals make their decisions on  
whether to be wage workers or entrepreneurs by comparing the utility from the 
wage work with that from the risky project. The endogenous interest rate 
adjusts to the point where the supply of credits is equal to the demand for 
funds, while the wage rate meets the labour market clearing condition. We 
explore the simultaneous equation at different situations and one of the 
comparative statics results. We find that as the maximal initial wealth 
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increases, the interest rate, the maximal and minimal labour needed by the 
project decreases while both wage rate and personal working time goes up.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
The criteria guiding individuals¶ labour-leisure choice and investment decision 
making have been studied in the existing literature from different points of view, 
such as inflation, taxation, human capital investment, legal protection and risk.. 
For example, Mansoorian and Mohsin (2010) construct a model of a small 
open economy in which households make labour-leisure choices and 
investment decisions on firms They examine the effect of inflation in this 
framework. Ghate (2007) discusses the implications of labour-leisure choice in 
an equilibrium tax rate model., Kenc (2004) extends the model of Asea and 
Turnovsky (1998) to include the supply of labour and discusses the 
relationship between taxation, risk-taking and capital accumulation. He allows 
the supply of labour to be endogenously determined and find it significantly 
affects risk-taking and capital accumulation. In addition, Bodie et al. (1992) 
have received considerable attention because the optimal choice of 
labour-leisure  generates a flexible investment opportunity set. Basak (1999) 
provides comparative static analysis of the effects of the labour-leisure choice 
on consumption, stock market and other factors. Galor and Zeira (1993) 
investigate the issue from the perspective of human capital investment. In their 
model, individuals are identical in terms of potential skills and preferences. 
However, similar to our model, their initial wealth is different. They find that 
individuals¶ wealth determines whether they invest in human capital or not. 
Furthermore, Balmaceda and Fischer (2010) investigate the interaction of the 
performance of economy, credit protection,  and bankruptcy procedures with 
different wealth distributions. They introduce labour market frictions (?) in the 
model and the results show that increased labour protection leads to lower 
wages. 
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In our model, individuals are heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth. The idea 
that initial wealth conditions may affect an economy¶s prosperity in long-term is 
common in development literatures (e.g., Romer (1986);Loury (1981);Murphy 
et al. (1989a, 1989b);Matsuyama (1991); Bertola (1993)). Our paper differs 
from theirs because most of the papers emphasize on how a technological 
improvement, specifically the productivity of capital, increases returns. Instead, 
we consider a pure wealth effect in an imperfect capital market (similar as 
Galor and Zeira (1993). Furthermore, except for Murphy et al. (1989), rarely 
did these papers focus on income distributions . On the other hand, some 
papers examine the issue with regard to risk preferences. For example,  
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) construct a competitive general equilibrium model 
in which individuals have a choice between undertaking a risky firm or working 
as a pure wage worker. Individuals are distinguished by their risk attitudes. 
They find, that in equilibrium the more risk averse individuals choose to 
become workers while the less risk averse individuals become entrepreneurs. 
Banerjee and Newman (1991) draw a similar conclusion that the rich should 
take risks and the poor should not. However, we presume all individuals have 
the same risk preference because we concentrate on how heterogeneity of 
wealth impacts occupation choice and in turn endogenously determines 
equilibriums of the capital market and the labour market.  
 
This paper models a simple economy with capital market imperfections which 
is derived from Bougheas (2007). We extend the financial equilibrium model of 
Bougheas by introducing a labour market to analyze the issues of occupation 
choice and labour-leisure decision when both physical capital and human 
capital are needed.  
 
In our model, individuals are heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth. They are 
also endowed one unit time resource in which they can balance between 
working and leisure to maximize their utility. Individuals can choose either to 
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sell their labour in the labour market or to self-employ in a risky project. Put 
differently, depending on the opportunity costs of alternatives, they can supply 
as pure wage workers or be entrepreneurs by running a risky project. The risky 
project needs a set-up cost which is similar to the model of Bougheas. 
However, our model requires not only capital inputs but also labour inputs. 
Workers receive fixed wages while entrepreneurs receive risky profits. 
Because of capital market imperfections, lenders cannot observe the project¶s 
returns so that borrowers always have incentive to report default and pay for 
the liquidation value. Lenders are in turn reluctant to provide with funds more 
than the liquidation value. In other words, individuals can borrow only limited 
amounts. Consequently, the risky project that needs high level of investment is 
beyond the reach of the poor. Thus the poor have to sell their labour and be 
pure wage workers. In contrast, the richer individuals who can afford the set-up 
cost prefer the risky project and thus become entrepreneurs. In other words, 
Individuals make their decisions of  whether to be entrepreneurs or wage 
workers by comparing the utility from the risky project with the wage work. The 
endogenous interest rate adjusts to the point where the supply of credits is 
equal to the demand for funds, while the wage rate meets the labour market 
clearing conditions. In fact, classification of agents according to their activities 
is discussed by numerous literature. For example, Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) 
models an agrarian economy in which entrepreneurs subject to not only the 
restriction on working capital but also moral hazard. In other words, workers 
hired by agent need supervision. Therefore individuals in this model allocate 
their time across three activities. The first one is selling his labour in the market. 
The second one is working on his own business. The last one is supervising 
hired labour on his farm. Bowles (2003) makes an adaption to a modern 
capitalist economy of a model by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986). In Bowles's 
model, individuals are further sorted into six classes depends on the level of 
the wealth. He define as pure wage worker, mixed independent producer and 
wage worker, independent producer, small capitalist, pure capitalist, and 
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rentier capitalist. Our model differs from theirs with respect to several aspects. 
For example, we don't present moral hazard so there is no necessary for 
supervision. In addition, all individuals in our model have the same utility 
function of leisure so that they share the same time schedule while theirs are 
not. Eswaran and Kotwal's model implies that richer employers even consume 
smaller amounts of leisure. 
 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) model the interplay between individuals¶ 
occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth. Because of capital 
market imperfections, the poor individuals choose to be workers while wealthy 
individuals become entrepreneurs who monitor the former. In static equilibrium 
the occupational structure depends on distribution. Instead of simply 
distinguishing individuals between the wage workers and the entrepreneurs. 
Our model further splits entrepreneurs into three groups. A few poor 
entrepreneurs carry out the project only in suboptimal investment because of 
the capital restriction. Medium wealth entrepreneurs perform a full investment 
on the risky project after collecting sufficient funds from the capital market. The 
rich entrepreneurs not only self-finance the project but also lend the rest of 
money in the capital market. Such improvement reveals more details of 
relationship between heterogeneity of wealth and occupation choice. 
 
A simple intuition of the relationship between wealth and labour-leisure choices 
is that the rich have a lower marginal utility of wealth. They prefer to enjoy 
more leisure and reduce their working time. Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky 
(2006) examine the issue in this way. They develop an endogenous growth 
model with elastic labour supply which is an extension of Romer (1986). In 
their framework, the growth rate and the distribution of income are jointly 
determined. The equilibrium labour supply determines the interest rate and in 
turn affect s both the capital accumulation and the distribution of income over 
individuals. The critical role of the wealth and the effect on the labour-leisure 
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choice is also studied by Ortigueira (2000) and Turnovsky (2000). Our model 
demonstrates some evidence to support their conclusion. For example, the 
production function of the risky project is a function of labour. The richer an 
entrepreneurs is, the more workers he can hire and in turn the higher returns 
from the project he obtains. In other words, wealth distribution affects income 
distribution and capital accumulation from the side of labour supply. However, 
a significant difference between these models and ours is that we place the 
same utility function of time resource across individuals so that all individuals 
share the same time schedule. We then run a comparative statics analysis to 
explore how the mean wealth impacts on occupation and labour-leisure 
choices. In particular, an increase in the mean wealth leads to an increase in 
credit supply. In turn the interest rate goes down. Suppose that other factors of 
the system do not change immediately at the moment, the lower interest rate 
implies the cheaper borrowing cost thus a few pure wage workers become 
entrepreneurs and a few suboptimal investment entrepreneurs now prefer to 
full invest in the project. Consequently there is an increase in labour demand 
and the wage rate rises. Furthermore, the wage workers would like to spend 
more time in working because of the higher wage, so do the entrepreneurs. 
Put differently, the working time increases as the mean wealth goes up. On the 
other hand, an increasing wage rate naturally makes entrepreneurs reduce the 
number of employees. So the optimal amount of labour decreases as the 
mean wealth increases. Finally, since the minimal amount of labour positively 
relates to the interest rate, it is also decreases with the mean wealth.. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.3 introduces the 
general framework of the model and describes the different situations of the 
economy. Section 4.4 gives the simultaneous equation to determine the 
system in equilibrium status. Section 4.5 provides a comparative statics 
analysis of the last case that the demand for credits varies over the range 
between the maximum and the minimum value of funds supply. The last 
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section is a conclusion. 
 
4.3 The Model of the Imperfect Capital Market 
In Chapter 1, we have illustrated the progress of how individuals make 
investment decisions when they are in an imperfect market environment. In 
that case, individuals only consider how to allocate their endowments to 
maximize their returns. The model does not consider the situation when 
individuals can choose their occupations. In this chapter, we will explore the 
issue of how individuals maximize their utilities by allocating both wealth and 
time. For simplicity, instead of the continuous investment model in Chapter 2, 
we adopt a fixed investment model which is essentially identical to Bougheas 
(2007).  
 
There is a continuum agent indexed by i in the economy. A single capital good 
can be either invested or consumed. The economy has one period which lasts 
one unit time. At the beginning of the period the agent is endowed with a 
random wealth Wi, where [0, ]iW W
 . The agent consumes and gets returns at 
the end of the period. We assume that the initial wealth follows a uniform 
distribution. Let G(W) denote the distribution of endowments across of agents, 
then ( ) iWG W
W
 . And the density function is  1( )g w
W
 . The mean wealth of 
the economy thus is 
^
0
( )
2
W
i i
WW Wg W dW
 
  ³ . Individuals have to choose to 
whether or how much invest in one of the methods describing below, 
meanwhile, they have to allocate their time resource properly to maximize the 
utility.  
 
The most straightforward way of arranging endowments is to lend funds in the 
capital market. The interest rate, which is endogenously determined in order to 
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clear the capital market, is  RE(>1). The second way is a riskless CRS 
technology which produces a constant return Z(>1). The last one is a risky 
project. We have mentioned that it is a fixed-investment model. It suggests that 
the return of the project is sharply decreasing beyond a certain investment 
level of physical capital. Comparing to the usual fixed-investment model, we 
allow a continuous human capital investment while the physical capital is fixed. 
Put differently, the idea of µfixed-investment¶ is equivalent to a fixed set-up cost, 
but entrepreneurs can have many employees working for them. Therefore the 
project needs K units working capital and n units labour, where n is a variable 
which indicates the total units of labour used. Then the project yields f(n) with 
probability p , or to be liquidated with a value l otherwise. The product function 
is increasing and concave in n, namely, f¶Q! and f´ Q. These conditions 
make sure that the labour input for the project is finite.  
 
In addition, we assume there is no moral hazard in the labour market so that 
no one shirks and no supervision is needed. Given all these conditions, 
individuals have two options to manage their time resource. They can either 
spend time t on working or have a rest for time s. Since each individual has 
one unit time, it means 1t s  .  
 
Furthermore, the return of the project is private information at the imperfect 
capital market. Without an effective way of monitoring, entrepreneurs naturally 
have incentive to report a return of no more than l  even if they succeed, 
where l  is the liquidation value of the project. Thus lenders will provide funds 
of no more than l to any borrowers. In other words, the maximum credits that 
a lender lends equal E
l
R
. /HW¶s denote an individual¶s utility as  
( , ) ( )U Y s Y u s                           (4.1) 
where Y is the present value of total earnings and u(i) is the leisure function 
and '( ) 0, "( ) 0, '(0)u s u s u!   f . Conditions '( ) 0, "( ) 0u s u s!  indicate that the 
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utility of leisure is finite while '(0)u  f  implies that all individuals must have 
some leisure. The linear utility function demonstrates that all individuals are 
risk-neutral.  Suppose that w(>1) is the price of labour and wages are paid at 
the outset. Individuals who do not undertake the risky project have two options. 
They can either rest or be a pure worker.  
 
Suppose some individuals prefer to rest all the time. It means 1s   and the 
utility is  
0 (1)EiU WR u                          (4.2) 
E
iWR  is the return from the capital market if an individual lend all the initial 
endowments. (1)u  is the utility of leisure for all the time. Alternatively, if the 
individual prefer to spend a few time at working, suppose it is ds, the current 
utility is  
1 [ (1) '(1) ]E EiU WR u u ds wdsR                  (4.3) 
'(1)u ds  is the utility of leisure that the individual sacrificed for working. So 
(1) '(1)u u ds  is the actual utility of leisure. Since we presume wages are paid 
at the beginning of the period, workers must lend wages to the capital market 
to increase their final utility. Then  EwdsR   is the return of this part of the 
investment. Naturally, hard-working individuals must be better off than those 
spending all the time to loaf around. Thus it comes out 
1 0 '(1) 0EU U wdsR u ds   ! . That is '(1) Eu wR . It means that the marginal 
utility of resting all the time is always smaller than the return of lending the 
wage to the capital market. This encourages individuals to work. In addition, as 
we all know, the smallest interest rate of the model is equal to the return of 
CRS, namely Z. Otherwise no one would lend money to the capital market. In 
our case, the condition '(1) Eu wR  always holds if only '(1)u wZ . So we 
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have the assumption below: 
Assumption 4.1: '(1)u wZ  
 
According to the previous definition, a pure wage worker sells his labour and 
lends his money. The utility of a pure wage worker is 
2 [ ] (1 )E iU R wt W u t                          (4.4) 
The first item of the right hand side of (4.4) describes that the individual invests 
both the wage and the initial endowment in the capital market. While (1 )u t  is 
the utility of leisure after deducting working time. Making a first order derivative 
to (4.4) gives the optimal value of working time for pure workers, which is 
'(1 ) 0ER w u t   . Formally,  
      ' ( 1 ) Eu t R w                                 (4.5) 
The equation states that, a pure wage worker will stop working when the 
marginal utility of leisure equals the price of labour multiplying the interest rate. 
Thus their optimal working time *t  is determined by (4.5). 
Alternatively, if the individual undertakes the risky project, then he does not sell 
his labour to the labour market any longer. Instead, he works for his own 
project. Since there is no need to monitor employees in this case, the 
entrepreneur devote all the working time to the project. The utility is  
3 [ ( ) (1 ) ] [ ( ) ( )] (1 )E iU pf n p l R w n t K W u t              (4.6) 
The first term of the right hand side of (4.6) presents the returns of the risky 
project; the second term describes the total repayment of the capital market at 
the end of period. From the time resource point of view, own labour is 
equivalent to hired labour from the labour market. In other words, own 
employment is perfect substitute for hired workers. The entrepreneurs also 
need to pay for their own labour. So the returns of own labour must be 
deducted from the working capital. It is the reason that the sign of t  is 
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negative. Therefore the optimization problem is to maximize (4.6).  The partial 
derivative of (4.6) are '( ) 0EnU pf n R w   and '(1 ) 0EtU R w u t    , 
respectively. Rearranging the two equations gives  
'( ) Epf n R w                             (4.7) 
'(1 ) Eu t R w                             (4.8) 
Equation (4.7) states that it makes no sense to hire more labour as long as the 
marginal expected return of the project equals the opportunity cost of hiring 
one unit labour. The maximal units of labour of the project are determined by 
the equation. Equation (4.8) depicts that an agent will stop working as soon as 
the marginal utility of leisure equals the wage multiplying the interest rate. It is 
absolutely the same as (4.5). The result implies that all agents share the same 
time scheme. In other words, all individuals in the system propose to working 
for *t  , which is determined by (4.8). 
 
In addition, one of the features of imperfect market is asymmetric information. 
In other words, the lenders cannot observe the realized returns of the risky 
project and the borrowers always have incentives to pretend that their returns 
are just l  even if they succeed in the project. Therefore the lenders are willing 
to provide maximally E
l
R
 to any borrowers. Consequently, an individual¶s 
initial endowments are tightly related to his investment and occupation choice. 
For example, the poor agents whose wealth is smaller than ElK wt R   
never meet the set-up cost of the risky project. Thus they have to be pure 
wage workers. The decisions of the others depend on which choice yields 
more benefits. The difference of the utilities between being a wage worker and 
being an entrepreneur is  
3 2 [ ( ) (1 ) ] ( )EU U pf n p l R K wn                      (4.9) 
The first term is the return of the risky project while the second one is the 
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capital market return of the total investment. The latter is exactly the 
opportunity cost of being entrepreneurs. Given a level of labour input, if (4.9) is 
positive, then the returns of the risky project is higher than its opportunity cost. 
An individual would prefer being an entrepreneur to being a wage worker, vice 
versa. Only if (4.9) is equal to zero, the individual would be indifferent between 
being an entrepreneur and being a worker. It implies that there is a cut-off 
value of labour input when  3 2U U . Hence the minimal labour input n  is 
determined by 3 2U U . Individuals whose working capital cannot meet the 
minimal labour level would prefer to be wage workers even though they can 
afford the set-up cost of the project. We will examine each term of (4.9).  
 
Suppose  
1( ) ( ) (1 )Y n pf n p l                        (4.10) 
2( ) E EY n R wn R K                         (4.11) 
 
We plot (4.10) and (4.11) in Figure 4.1. Since the interest rate varies as the 
initial conditions change, the slope in the figures below may change as well.  
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Figure 4.1 
 
where n

 is the minimal labour input and *n  is the optimal level of labour. 
Firstly, l  is the liquidation value of K. So K l! . We also know 1ER ! while 
1 1p  . Hence (1 )EKR p l!  . Secondly, the maximal unit return of the project 
is  
*
*
*
( ) (1 )pf n p lR
K wn
                     (4.12) 
We know that the interest rate cannot exceed *R , otherwise no one would 
invest in the risky project. It implies 
*
*
( ) (1 )E pf n p lR
K wn
 d  . Rearranging the 
inequality gives * *( ) (1 ) ( )Epf n p l R K wn  t  . The left hand side of the 
inequality is exactly *1( )Y n  while the right hand side is *2 ( )Y n . Put differently, 
* *
1 2( ) ( )Y n Y nt . The inequality indicates that the equation 1 2( ) ( )Y n Y n  has at 
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least one solution. Furthermore, 1 '( ) '( )Y n pf n and 2 '( ) EY n R w  while (4.7) 
tells us that '( ) Epf n R w . So 1 2'( ) '( )Y n Y n . It means that the marginal utility 
of 1( )Y n  is exactly equal to the slope of the line (4.10). The level of the optimal 
labour, *n  , is determined by this equation.  
 
Under the perfect market conditions, lenders can always observe borrowers¶ 
returns and there is no moral hazard problem. All entrepreneurs raise enough 
funds to carry out the project at the optimal investment level. In other words, 
the labour they used for the project is always *n . The line 2Y  in Figure 4.1 lifts 
upwards to the position of the dash line. The minimal labour input is just equal 
to the optimal level. There is only one solution for the labour input, namely *n . 
The imperfect market case, however, is quite different. Some entrepreneurs 
cannot collect necessary money to perform an optimal investment project on 
account of the moral hazard problem. For example, entrepreneurs whose 
wealth falls into the range from ElK wn R    to 
*
E
lK wn R    will never 
reach the optimal investment level *K wn  , because they can borrow ElR  
at most from the capital market. With the restriction of working capital, the 
amount of labour they used in the project must be smaller than *n .  The 
result implies that there is another cut-off level for the labour input, at which 
individuals are indifferent in investing in a project or being a wage worker. 
Therefore the difference between the utility of being an entrepreneur and the 
utility of being a pure worker disappears, which means 3 2 0U U  . Put 
differently, there is an equation 1 2( ) ( )Y n Y n  to meet the minimal labour level 
n

. The equation is also expressed as ( ) (1 ) ( )Epf n p l R K wn     . 
Rearranging it obtains 
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( ) (1 )
E
pf n p l
R
K wn


                       (4.13) 
 
In summary, the case is listed below 
 
                               A                    B                         C                      D 
                      0        ElK wn R      
*
E
lK wn R           
*K wn               W  
Figure 4.2 
 
In Figure 4.2, three cut-off values divide individuals into four different groups. 
i. Individuals in area A are pure wage workers and lenders. They sell their 
labour in the labour market and only invest in either the capital market or 
CRS technology. 
ii. Entrepreneurs in area B borrow an amount of money E
l
R
 to undertake the 
risky project at the suboptimal investment level. 
iii. Entrepreneurs in area C can raise money to meet the requirement for full 
investment in the project.  
iv. Individuals in area D are self-finance and invest the rest of money in either 
the capital market or CRS technology. 
All individuals would like to work for time *t . We also place a restriction on  
the maximal total investment so that 
Assumption 4.2: *0 K wn W
  
 
 
There are three different situations. 
Proposition 1 
98 
 
a) if  
*
*
*
*( ) ( )K wn i ilK wn
R
K wn W g W dW

 
ª º  !¬ ¼³  
*
*
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn W
R
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW
 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³   
then *ER R .  
There is an excess demand in the system. The proportion of entrepreneurs 
undertaking the risky project at the optimal level is 
*
( )
E
W
i
lK wn
R
g W dW

 
³  . The 
proportion of wage workers is 
*
0
( )
E
lK wn
R
ig W dW
 
³  .  
No one invests in CRS technology 
 
b) if  
* *
*
*( ) ( )
lK wn K wnZ
i i il lK wn K wnZ Z
l g W dW K wn W g W dWZ

  
   
ª º   ¬ ¼³ ³  
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
then ER Z .  
There is an excess supply in the economy. The proportion of 
entrepreneurs undertaking the risky project at suboptimal level is 
*
( )
lK wn Z
ilK wn Z
g W dW

 
 ³ . The proportion of entrepreneurs who carry out the 
project at optimal level is 
*
( )W ilK wn Z g W dW

 ³ . The capital which is invested 
in CRS is 
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
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* *
*
*( ) ( )
lK wn K wnZ
i i il lK wn K wnZ Z
l g W dW K wn W g W dWZ

  
   
ª º   ¬ ¼³ ³
 
 
c) if 
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º   d¬ ¼³ ³  
* *
*
*( ) ( )E
E E
lK wn K wn
R
E i i il lK wn K wn
R R
l g W dW K wn W g W dWR
  
   
ª º   d¬ ¼³ ³  
*
*
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn W
R
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW
 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
Then *RRZ E dd  
The proportion of entrepreneurs undertaking the risky project at 
suboptimal level is 
*
( )E
E
lK wn
R
ilK wn
R
g W dW

 
 ³ . The proportion of entrepreneurs 
carrying out the project at optimal level is 
*
( )
E
W
ilK wn
R
g W dW

 ³ .  
No capital is left for CRS technology 
 
Proof. 
1) We know that the maximal interest rate cannot exceed *R , otherwise 
no agents would consider the risky technology. When the inequality 
holds, there is an excess demand for credits because the proportion of 
projects that entrepreneurs are willing to invest is more than the 
proportion of projects that lenders can fund. Hence the return from the 
capital market must be equal to the highest return from the project. Here
*ER R  also means  
*
*
*
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )E pf n p l pf n p lR R
K wn K wn


        .  
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It implies *n n  . In other words, the minimal labour input of a project is 
equal to its optimal value as long as *RRE  . Figure 4.3 shows the 
status of this case.  
                                ( )wS                                         ( )eS  
                                           A                                    C                      D 
0                                   * ElK wn R           
*K wn              W  
 
Figure 4.3 
 
( )wS  presents the proportion of wage workers and ( )eS  is the 
counterpart of entrepreneurs who invest in the risky technology with 
optimal value. Here µw¶ is just the abbreviation of µworker¶ and µe¶ denote 
µentrepreneur¶. In this case, area B of Figure 4.2 where entrepreneurs 
undertake the project at the suboptimal level disappears because 
individuals cannot afford the price of loans at such a high interest rate. 
They prefer to be wage workers instead. Consequently, there are only 
three groups of agents. The first one is in area A where there are only 
pure wage workers. The second group consists of entrepreneurs who 
borrow necessary money to support their full investment in projects. 
The rest of rich individuals are self-finance. The proportion of 
entrepreneurs undertaking the risky project at the optimal level is 
*
( )
E
W
i
lK wn
R
g W dW

 
³  . The proportion of wage workers is 
*
0
( )
E
lK wn
R
ig W dW
 
³  .  
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No one invests CRS technology because of the shortage of credits.   
 
2) We also know that the lowest interest rate cannot be smaller than Z, 
otherwise all agents would prefer to invest in CRS technology. When 
the inequality holds, there is an excess supply of funds because the 
proportion of projects that entrepreneurs are willing to invest is less than 
the proportion of projects that lenders can support. Competition from 
the capital market puts pressure on the interest rate so that it reduces to 
Z. Contrast to the first case, both suboptimal investment and full 
investment entrepreneurs are funded.  The rest of capital will be 
invested in CRS technology. The proportion of entrepreneurs 
undertaking the risky project at suboptimal level is  
*
( )
lK wn Z
ilK wn Z
g W dW

 
 ³ . The proportion of entrepreneurs carrying out the 
project at optimal level is 
*
( )W ilK wn Z g W dW

 ³ . The spare capital which is 
invested in CRS is 
 
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
 
* *
*
*( ) ( )
lK wn K wnZ
i i il lK wn K wnZ Z
l g W dW K wn W g W dWZ

  
   
ª º   ¬ ¼³ ³
 
 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates this situation 
 
102 
 
  ( )wS                ( )eS

                                 ( )eS  
                  A                     B                          C                     D 
         0          lK wn
Z
           * lK wn
Z
             *K wn              W  
 
Figure 4.4 
The proportion of wage workers is ( )wS , the proportion of suboptimal 
investment entrepreneurs is ( )eS

 and the proportion of full-investment 
entrepreneurs is ( )eS , respectively.  
 
3) The minimal supply of funds in the economy is 
*
*
0
( ) ( ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  when ZRE   on 
account of the very low interest rate.  
The maximal supply of funds is  
*
*
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn W
R
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW
 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³ when *RRE   
because of the high interest rate. The inequality means that the demand 
of credits in the economy varies between the maximum and the 
minimum value of supply. When the inequality holds, there is an excess 
demand of credits if ZRE   and an excess supply of credits if *RRE  . 
In this case ER  varies between Z  and *R . It will reach its equilibrium 
point as long as the total demand equals the total supply, namely the 
market clearing point.  The proportion of entrepreneurs undertaking 
the risky project at the suboptimal level is 
*
( )E
E
lK wn
R
l iK wn
R
g W dW

 
 ³ . The 
proportion of entrepreneurs carrying out the project at the optimal level 
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is 
*
( )
E
W
l iK wn
R
g W dW

 ³  . No one invests in CRS technology because the 
capital market is clear at the point that the demand for credits equals the 
supply. Figure 4.5 exhibits this situation 
        ( )wS                ( )eS

                                 ( )eS  
                       A                     B                         C                     D 
             0        E
lK wn
R
        * ElK wn R              
*K wn              W  
 Figure 4.5 
The proportion of wage workers is ( )wS , the proportion of suboptimal 
investment entrepreneurs is ( )eS

 and the proportion of full-investment 
entrepreneurs is ( )eS , respectively.  
 
4.4 The Simultaneous Equation of Equilibrium 
Proposition 1 provides a general outline of the model with three different 
situations. It distinguishes different cases in terms of the demand and supply of 
credits. However, we are also interested in what happens in the labour market. 
For example, how the wage rate is determined and what the optimal level of 
the labour used in the risky project. Similarly, we concern what factors 
influence the interest rate in the capital market. In this section, we will construct 
a series of simultaneous equations in terms of the capital market and the 
labour market clearing conditions. 
 
1) If 
*
*
*
*( ) ( )K wn i ilK wn
R
K wn W g W dW

 
ª º  !¬ ¼³  
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*
*
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn W
R
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW
 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
then *ER R . In this case, too much borrowers pursue too little funds. 
Competition in the capital market pushes the interest rate up to the highest 
level which is equal to the returns of the risky project preformed at the 
optimal level. The interest rate is determined by (4.16), namely 
*
*
*
( ) (1 )E pf n p lR R
K wn
    . The equations of (4.13) and (4.16) also state 
that the minimal labour level is equal to the optimal level. It in turn implies 
that only the project carried out at the optimal level is profitable. 
Substituting *ER R 
 
 into (4.7) and (4.8) gives  
* *
'( )pf n R w                        (4.14) 
* *
'(1 )u t R w                        (4.15) 
The labour market clearing condition is that the total demand for labour, 
which is *( )e nS , equals the supply of labour *t . What¶s more, the capital 
market clearing condition is that the total demand for credits, which is 
*( ) ( )K wn eS , is equal to the supply ^W . 
 
The system is thus determined by the following equations 
* *
'( )pf n R w                      (4.14) 
* *
'(1 )u t R w                       (4.15) 
*
*
*
( ) (1 )pf n p lR
K wn
                   (4.16) 
( ) ( ) 1w eS S                       (4.17) 
* * *( ) ( )( )w t e n tS S                  (4.18) 
      
^
*( ) ( )K w n e WS                    (4.19) 
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(4.17) demonstrates that the sum of the proportion of pure wage workers 
 and the proportion of entrepreneurs is one. (4.18) is the labour market 
 clearing condition.  The left hand side is the labour supply while the right 
 hand side is the demand. They must equal in the market equilibrium. The 
 last equation states that the equilibrium of the capital market. In this case, 
 each entrepreneur needs *K wn  to carry out a full investment project. 
 Hence the left hand side is the average demand of credits while the 
 average supply of funds is presented by the right hand side. We finally 
 have six endogenous variables, namely *n , n

, 
*t , w , ( )wS
 
and  ( )eS , 
 respectively. We also have six equations. The system should be 
 determined by the simultaneous equation. 
 
2) If 
* *
*
*( ) ( )
lK wn K wnZ
i i il lK wn K wnZ Z
l g W dW K wn W g W dWZ

  
   
ª º   ¬ ¼³ ³  
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
then ER Z . Credits in this system not only meet the requirement of 
demand from borrowers but also flow into CRS technology.  Put differently, 
there are so many funds that the interest rate of the capital market shrinks 
to the level of CRS returns. Substituting ER Z 
 
 into (4.7) and (4.8) gives 
*
'( )pf n Zw                          (4.20) 
'(1 )u t Zw                           (4.21) 
Substituting ER Z again into (4.13) gives 
( ) (1 )pf n p l
Z
K wn


                      (4.22) 
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Apparently, the sum of proportions of all individuals in Figure 4.4 is one. 
So we have  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1w e eS S S

                    (4.23) 
From Figure 4.4 we also have 
*
*( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn
Z
i
lK wn
Z
w
e g W dW n n
W
S

 
 
 
  ³   
So  
*( ) ( )we n n
W
S                        (4.24) 
and 
*
*
( ) ( ) 1
W
i
lK wn
Z
lK wn Ze g W dW
W
S


 
   ³ , that is 
*
( ) 1
lK wn Ze
W
S 
                  (4.25) 
In addition, the labour market clearing condition is that the supply of 
labour equals the demand . That is  
*
* *[ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
l iK wn
Z
l iK wn
Z
lW K
Zw e e t g W dW e n
w
S S S S

 
  
 
   ³          
The left hand side of the equation is the amount of labour supply in the 
economy. The first item of the right hand side is the labour demanded 
by entrepreneurs in area B of Figure 4.4. The item i
lW K
Z
   is the 
working capital and 
i
lW K
Z
w
 
 is the total labour they used. The 
second item of the right hand side presents total labour used by the rich 
entrepreneurs. Substituting (4.23) into it and rearranging it gives 
*
* * *1 ( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn
Z
l i iK wn
Z
l K
Zt Wg W dW n n e n
w W
S

 
  

   ³   
107 
 
Let¶s set 
*^
( )
lK wn
Z
le i iK wn
Z
W Wg W dW
 
 
 
 ³  as the average wealth of all 
suboptimal investment entrepreneurs. Thus we have 
^
* * *( ) ( )e
l KW
Zt n n e n
w W
S  

            (4.26) 
It is worth mentioning that the total credits supply does not clear the 
demand for funds from borrowers because of the exceeding supply of 
funds. Finally, the system is determined by the following equations: 
*
'( )pf n Zw                            (4.20) 
'(1 )u t Zw                             (4.21) 
( ) (1 )pf n p l
Z
K wn


                        (4.22) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1w e eS S S

                       (4.23) 
*( ) ( )we n n
W
S                           (4.24) 
*
( ) 1
lK wn Ze
W
S 
                    (4.25) 
^
* * *( ) ( )e
l KW
Zt n n e n
w W
S  

             (4.26) 
(4.20) demonstrates the sum of the proportions of workers and 
entrepreneurs is one. (4.21) is the proportion of entrepreneurs whose 
investment is suboptimal. (4.22) is the proportion of entrepreneurs 
performing full investment. (4.23), (4.24) and (4.25) are discussed 
above. last equation is the labour market clearing condition.  We finally 
have seven endogenous variables, which are *n , n

, 
*t , w , ( )wS  , 
( )eS

 and ( )eS , respectively. We also have seven equations. The 
system should be determined by the simultaneous equation. 
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3) If 
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn WZ
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW


 

ª º   d¬ ¼³ ³  
* *
*
*( ) ( )E
E E
lK wn K wn
R
E i i il lK wn K wn
R R
l g W dW K wn W g W dWR
  
   
ª º   d¬ ¼³ ³  
*
*
*
*
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lK wn W
R
i iK wn
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW
 

ª º  ¬ ¼³ ³  
Then *EZ R Rd d . In this case, the interest rate of the capital market 
varies in the range between the CRS returns and the optimal level returns 
from the risky project in order to clear both the capital and the labour 
markets. The equations (4.7) and (4.8) still hold in this case. Hence the 
optimal working time and the maximal labour used in the project are 
determined by the two equations. Equation (4.13) defines the interest rate 
as usual. In addition, as Figure 4.5 shows that individuals in this case are 
divided into three groups so that the sum of proportions of all individuals is 
one. We have 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1w e eS S S

                     (4.27) 
 
 Figure 4.5 also indicates that 
*
*( ) ( ) ( )
E
E
lK wn
R
i
lK wn
R
w
e g W dW n n
W
S

 
 
 
  ³ ,  
so 
*( ) ( )we n n
W
S                         (4.28) 
And 
*
*
( ) ( ) 1
E
W E
i
lK wn
R
lK wn
Re g W dW
W
S


 
 
  ³ . That is  
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*
( ) 1 E
lK wn Re
W
S 
 
                 (4.29) 
In this case, all credits are shared by the risky technology and the 
capital market. No one invests in CRS technology. Then the capital 
market clearing condition is that the supply of credit meets the demand. 
That is 
*
* *
*
*
0
*
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
E
E
EE
lK wn W
R
i i i iK wn
lK wn K wn
R
ll i i iE K wnK wn
RR
Wg W dW W K wn g W dW
l g W dW K wn W g W dW
R



 

  
  
ª º    ¬ ¼
ª º  ¬ ¼
³ ³
³ ³
             
Rearranging the above equation gives 
*
* *
* *
* *
0
*
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
E
E
E
EE
lK wn K wn W
R
li i i i i iK wn K wn
R
lK wn K wn W
R
ll i i iE K wn K wnK wn
RR
Wg W dW Wg W dW Wg W dW
l g W dW K wn g W dW g W dW
R




  
  
  
   
   
ª º  « »¬ ¼
³ ³ ³
³ ³ ³
 
The left hand side of the equation is equivalent to the average wealth of 
all individuals minus the average wealth of entrepreneurs who invest at 
the suboptimal level. Therefore the capital market equilibrium is 
determined by 
^ ^
*( ) ( ) ( )e E
lW W e K wn e
R
S S
 
              (4.30) 
where  
*^
( )E
E
lK wn
R
le i iK wn
R
W Wg W dW
 
 
 
 ³  is the average wealth of all 
suboptimal investment entrepreneurs. 
 
At last, the labour market clearing condition is  
*
* *[ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
E
E
lK wn
R i E
i
lK wn
R
lW K
Rw e e t g W dW e n
w
S S S S

 

 
 
   ³
 
The left hand side of the equation is the total supply of labour in the 
system. The first item of the right hand side is the labour demanded by 
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all suboptimal investment entrepreneurs. The second item is the labour 
demanded by full investment entrepreneurs. Rearranging the equation 
gives 
^
* * *( )( ) ( )e E
w l
wt W K n n e wn
RW
S
  
             (4.31) 
 
Thus the system is determined by the following equations: 
*
'( ) Epf n R w                               (4.7) 
*
'(1 ) Eu t R w                               (4.8) 
( ) (1 )
E
pf n p l
R
K wn


                           (4.13) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1w e eS S S

                           (4.27) 
*( ) ( )we n n
W
S                                (4.28) 
*
( ) 1 E
lK wn
Re
W
S 
 
 
 
                      (4.29) 
^ ^
*( ) ( ) ( )e E
lW W e K wn e
R
S S
 
                  (4.30) 
^
* * *( )( ) ( )e E
w l
wt W K n n e wn
RW
S
  
               (4.31) 
Here we have eight endogenous variables, *n , n

, 
*t , w , ER , ( )wS , 
( )eS

 and ( )eS , respectively. The simultaneous equations provide a 
solution vector to determine the situation of the system 
 
4.5 A Case of Comparative Statics  
The model defines a set of variables such as the optimal amount of labour *n , 
the minimal level of labour n

, the optimal own labour *t , the work wage w  
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and the interest rate ER
. 
It also comes with exogenous parameters like the 
maximum value of the initial endowments. In the first chapter, we discussed 
the comparative statics results with two important parameters, namely the 
mean wealth 
^
W  and the half difference of wealth from the poorest to the 
richest X . The two parameters is integrated into one because 
^
2
WW X

   in 
this framework. It turns out that we are interested in how the system changes 
as the maximal wealth changes.  
 
In summary, the first two cases of the model are both extreme situations. For 
example, the interest rate equals either the maximal return of the risky project 
when there is an excess demand of credits, or the CRS returns when there is 
an excess supply of funds. Rarely do they occur in the real world. Hence we 
are seeking a more general situation which presents reality as much as 
possible. The case 3 in which the demand for credits varies over the range 
between the maximum and the minimum value of funds supply can meet this 
requirement. In this case, both the capital market and the labour market clear 
as long as the demand of funds equals the supply of it. In turn, the interest rate 
varies between Z  and *R  to clear both the capital and the labour markets. 
We are trying to explore the effects of altering W

 in the system. 
 
 We have shown that the system is determined by the following equations: 
*
'( ) Epf n R w                               (4.7) 
*
'(1 ) Eu t R w                               (4.8) 
( ) (1 )
E
pf n p l
R
K wn


                           (4.13) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1w e eS S S

                           (4.27) 
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*( ) ( )we n n
W
S                                (4.28) 
*
( ) 1 E
lK wn
Re
W
S 
 
 
 
                      (4.29) 
^ ^
*( ) ( ) ( )e E
lW W e K wn e
R
S S
 
                  (4.30) 
^
* * *( )( ) ( )e E
w l
wt W K n n e wn
RW
S
  
               (4.31) 
 
Substituting ( )eS

 and ( )eS  into (4.30) and (4.31) gets rid of the proportion of 
labour in both equations.  We then obtain the capital market and the labour 
market clearing conditions with five endogenous variables. They are the 
optimal number of employees *n , the minimal labour n

, the optimal working 
time *t , the wage rate w and the interest rate ER , respectively. The two 
markets clearing conditions with additional equations such as (4.7), (4.8) and 
(4.13) constitute a simultaneous equation detecting a unique solution vector 
for these variables. Since there are five variables coming with five equations, it 
should have at least one solution for the system. However, we cannot obtain a 
reduce form solution owning to the general function of the product. So we will 
explore the comparative statics results instead, just like we have done in the 
first chapter. 
 
We adopted the method of Derivatives of Implicit Functions in the first chapter 
to explore the comparative statics issue for simultaneous equation without 
reduced forms. In this case, however, applying the method to a simultaneous 
equation with five equations requires approximately a great number of steps 
which may be prohibitively expensive. Hence we will adopt a simpler way to 
avoid such burdensome complication.  
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Firstly, we have the definition of the interest rate 
( ) (1 )
E
pf n p l
R
K wn


                         (4.13) 
Suppose there is a small increment of the maximum value of the initial wealth. 
It implies that the total credit supply of the system increases. The interest rate 
will in turn decrease, namely 0
ER
W

w 
w
. In addition, making a partial derivative 
of (4.13) to the minimal amount of labour obtains
 
2
'( )( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ]
( )
E pf n K wn w pf n p lR
n K wn
  
 
   w  w 
 
Substituting (4.7) into  the result above gives  
*
2
'( )
'( )( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ]
( )
E E
pf npf n K wn pf n p lR R
n K wn
  
 
   w  w 
 
*
2
'( )( ) '( )[ ( ) (1 ) ]
( )
E
E
pf n K wn R pf n pf n p l
R K wn
  

    
 
Substituting  (4.13) into the result again gives 
*
2
'( )[ ( ) (1 ) ] '( )[ ( ) (1 ) ]
( )
E
E
pf n pf n p l pf n pf n p lR
n R K wn
  
 
    w  w 
 
*
2
[ ( ) (1 ) ]
[ '( ) '( )]( )E
p pf n p l
f n f n
R K wn



  
 
We know that  '( )f n  is a decreasing function in n  and *n n!
, 
so 
*
'( ) '( ) 0f n f n

 !
 
Finally, 0
ER
n

w !w . It states that the minimal amount of labour declines as soon 
as the interest rate drops. We then deduce that 0
n
W


w 
w
 from the fact that the 
interest rate negatively relates to W

.  
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Furthermore, making a partial derivative of (4.13) to wage obtains the relation 
between the interest rate and the wage. That is 
2
[ ( ) (1 ) ]
0( )
E n pf n p lR
w K wn
 

 w   w 
 
It describes that the wage rate negatively relates to the interest rate. Because 
of 0
ER
W

w 
w
, we the have 0w
W

w !
w
. It means that the larger the wealth is, the 
higher the wage is.  
 
Furthermore, rearranging (4.7) gives 
*
'( )
E
pf n
w
R
                        (4.32) 
Making a partial derivative of (4.32) gives 
*
*
"( ) 0E
w pf n
n R
w  w , so 
*
0n
W

w 
w
. It means that the optimal number of employees 
negatively relates to W

.  
 
Again, rearranging (4.8) provides another reduced form definition of wage rate 
relating to the optimal working time. That is  
*
'(1 )
E
u t
w
R
                     (4.33)
 
Making a partial derivative of the above equation with respect to the optimal 
working time gives 
*
*
"(1 ) 0E
w u t
t R
w   !w , so 
*
0t
W

w !
w
. It tells that the optimal working time also 
positively relates to W

. 
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 Finally we have 0
ER
W

w 
w
, 0
n
W


w 
w
, 0w
W

w !
w
, 
*
0n
W

w 
w
 and 
*
0t
W

w !
w
.  
 
Unlike the model of Chapter 2, individuals¶ wealth is defined at the interval 
0,W
ª º« »¬ ¼  in Chapter 4. Increasing W

 is equivalent to jointly increase in both 
average wealth and the distribution of wealth. In particular, an increase in the 
mean wealth leads to an increase in credit supply. The interest rate goes down 
accordingly. Suppose that other factors of the system do not change 
immediately at the moment, a lower interest rate implies a lower borrowing 
cost so that two cut-off values in Figure 4.5, both E
lK wn
R
   and 
*
E
lK wn
R
  , move towards left. In other words, a few pure wage workers 
become entrepreneurs and a few suboptimal investment entrepreneurs now 
prefer to full investment in the project. Consequently there is an increase in 
labour demand and thus the wage rate rises. Furthermore, the wage workers 
would like to spend more time on working because of the higher wage, so do 
the entrepreneurs. Put differently, the labour time increases as the mean 
wealth goes up. On the other hand, an increasing wage rate naturally makes 
entrepreneurs reduce the number of employees. So the optimal amount of 
labour decreases as the mean wealth increases. Finally, since the minimal 
amount of labour positively relates to the interest rate, it is also decreases with 
the mean wealth. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
We present a static model of an economy where individuals are 
heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth and there are credit constraints due to 
moral hazard. Individuals are endowed with time resource which they can 
allocate between working and leisure to maximize their utility. What¶s more, 
individuals can choose either to sell their labour in the labour market or to 
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self-employ. Put differently, depending on the opportunity costs of alternatives, 
they can supply as pure wage workers or become entrepreneurs by running a 
risky project. Unlike the model in Chapter 1, the risky project requires both 
capital and labour inputs. Workers receive fixed wages while entrepreneurs 
receive risky profits. Individuals make their decisions on whether to be wage 
workers or entrepreneurs by comparing the utility from the wage work with that 
from the risky project. The endogenous interest rate adjusts to the point where 
the supply of credits is equal to the demand for funds, while the wage rate 
meets the labour market clearing condition. We find that an increase in the 
mean wealth leads to a decrease in the interest rate. In equilibrium, the wage 
rate rises and so does the labour time. Meanwhile, both the optimal amount of 
labour and the minimal requirement of labour of the project decrease. A further 
development of the model can distinguish risk preferences over individuals, 
and extend the static model to a dynamic one to discuss the issue of economic 
growth. 
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CHAPTER 5 Conclusion  
The thesis looks into the issue of imperfect market and asymmetric information 
and how individuals' initial wealth and the distribution of wealth affect their 
activities in imperfect markets. In Chapter 2 we investigate a model of 
asymmetric information on account of market imperfection. Individuals differ 
from their initial endowments. According to their restrictions of working capital, 
individuals make investment decision among the capital market, the CRS with 
constant returns and a risky project which has a fixed set-up cost. We find that 
the poorest individuals are pure lenders. Those low to medium wealth 
individuals borrow money which is equivalent to the liquidated value of the 
project and invest sub-optimally. Individuals with medium to high wealth can 
collect enough money to invest optimally. And the richest individuals 
self-finance. We then introduce a monitoring technology to make it possible for 
external lenders to observe the returns of the private project. Borrowers thus 
may obtain bank loans to be an alternative source of funds. Our result shows 
that the poorest individuals are still pure lenders. But some relatively poor 
individuals alter from lenders to entrepreneurs by obtaining bank loans to 
invest optimally. On the other hands, part of low to medium wealth agents 
prefer to the capital market because of the lower cost of direct finance, they 
invest sub-optimally. Meanwhile, other low to medium wealth individuals 
choose bank loans and invest optimally. Medium to high wealth individuals 
raise enough funds from the capital market to achieve an optimal investment. 
Those richest individuals still self-finance.  
 
Chapter 3 examines one of the comparative static results of Chapter 2 by a 
panel of 16 countries for the period 1989-2004. The comparative static result 
states that if income difference across social groups is lower than a threshold, 
a rise in average income would push up the minimal investment level and the 
interest rate. Otherwise it would reduce both of them. Our empirical model 
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develops further to predict that financial development must be positively 
related to average income if income inequality is small, while it is negatively 
related to average income if income inequality is higher than the critical value. 
We adopt a modified method of the multiple thresholds regression to the model 
in order to inspect this prediction. We find overwhelming evidence of the 
threshold effect. The point estimates of the two thresholds are 36.6 and 37.663 
respectively. It means when income inequality is lower than 37.663, a rise of 
average income would improves financial development. As long as income 
inequality is higher than this value, financial development does not benefit from 
average income. 
 
The model of Chapter 4 is derived from that of Chapter 2 except for introducing 
a labour market. The extension make it possible to analyze markets 
equilibrium conditions from both physical capital and human capital. We 
present a static model of an economy where individuals are heterogeneous in 
terms of initial wealth and there are credit constraints due to asymmetric 
information. Individuals are endowed with time resource which they can 
DOORFDWH EHWZHHQ ZRUNLQJ DQG OHLVXUH WR PD[LPL]H WKHLU XWLOLW\:KDW¶V PRUH
individuals can choose either to sell their labour in the labour market or to 
self-employ. Put differently, depending on the opportunity costs of alternatives, 
they can supply as pure wage workers or become entrepreneurs by running a 
risky project. Unlike the model in Chapter 1, the risky project requires both 
capital and labour inputs. Workers receive fixed wages while entrepreneurs 
receive risky profits. Individuals make their decisions on whether to be wage 
workers or entrepreneurs by comparing the utility from the wage work with that 
from the risky project. The endogenous interest rate adjusts to the point where 
the supply of credits is equal to the demand for funds, while the wage rate 
meets the labour market clearing condition. We find that an increase in the 
mean wealth leads to a decrease in the interest rate. In equilibrium, the wage 
rate rises and so does the labour time. Meanwhile, both the optimal amount of 
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labour and the minimal requirement of labour of the project decrease.  
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APPENDIX A.1 
Comparative Statics of the simultaneous equations  
 
In this model, there are four variables ER , I , 
*I  and *R and four equations.  
 
( ) (1 )
E
pf I p l
R
K I


                                           (2.3) 
pIf /1)(' *                                                (2.4) 
*
*
* )1()(
IK
lpIpfR 
                                        (2.5) 
*
* *
*
( ) ( / )
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( / )
*
( ) ( / ) ( / )
( ) ( ) ( )
( / ) ( ) ( ) ( )
E E
E
E E E
K I R l R W
i i i i
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K I l R K I
E
i i i
K I R l R K I l R
Wg W dW W K I g W dW
l R g W dW K I W g W dW




 

  
   
ª º  ¬ ¼
   
³ ³
³ ³
      (2.19) 
So we can have the results of the comparative statics for these simultaneous 
equations. Rearranging  equation (2.19) gives 
* *
* * *
* *
( ) ( / )
*
( / )
*
( ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( / ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
E E
E
E E E E
K I R l R W W
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W K I K I
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E
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So  
* *
*
( / ) ( / )
^
*
( ) ( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( / )
( ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) ( )
E E
E E E E E
K I l R K I l R W
E
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Applying the uniform distribution function on the last equation, we obtain 
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^ ^
* * * * *4 2( )( ) 2( )( / ) (2 )( )EXW K I W X K I K I l R K I I I I             
 
We eventually get another form of (2.19) 
^ ^
* * * *2( )( ) ( )(2 2 / ) ( )( ) 4 0EK I W X K I K I I l R K I I I XW              
 
(2.20) 
Note that (2.5) is a reduced form function of *R . Both ^W  and X are not 
presented in this equation, so they do not make sense to *R . Meanwhile,  *R  
also does not show in the rest of equations. Therefore we separate *R  from 
the method of Derivatives of Implicit Functions in order to simplify the issue.  
^ ^
* * * *2( )( ) ( )(2 2 / ) ( )( ) 4 0EK I W X K I K I I l R K I I I XW              () 
Finally, there is a 3x3 simultaneous equation.  
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E
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                           (2.3) 
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From (2.3) we have 
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From (2.4) we have 
*
'( ) 1 0pf I    
/HW¶VVHW 2 *'( ) 1F pf I   
2
0F
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2
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2
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2
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From (2.20) we have  
^ ^
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Here 1F  , 2F and 3F  possess continuous derivatives. 
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Since *"( ) 0f I   and '( ) 0Epf I R  ! , we have 0J ! . Because the Jacobian 
J  is nonzero, we can apply the implicit function theorem to the simultaneous 
equation 
 
Let¶s discuss comparative statics in terms of ^W  firstly. 
1 1 1 1
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By Cramer¶s rule, this solution can be expressed as  
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Let¶s see what determines the sign of * 2K I X  . 
 
Here we are discussing the comparative statics in terms of 
^
W . The condition 
implies that X is a constant. Since 
^
W W X W X


    , it says both W

 and W

 
must move when 
^
W  changes. If both W

 and W

 have a very tiny increment, 
let¶s set W' . It is shown in Figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12 
 
The total loss of supply funds, which is the area from W

 to 
( )E ElK I R R   ,is ( )
W W
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W
Wg W dW
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³ . Meanwhile, the total gain of funds in the 
area from *K I  to W W '  is *[ ( )] ( )
W W
i i
W
W K I g W dW


'
 ³ . If and only if the 
loss is equals to the gain, the minimal investment will not be changed. That is  
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 
 
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  ³ ³ . Solving the equation obtains 
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* 2K I W W X


    . Giving the conditions that * 2K I X   and X is a 
constant, this result indicates that no matter how the average wealth changes, 
the gain and the loss of funds supply is equal. Therefore the minimal 
investment value won¶t change in this case. That is 
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For the same reason 
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Secondly, Let¶s see how these endogenous variables changes in terms of X. 
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In conclusion, there are three different cases. 
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b) If * 2K I X  , then 
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APPENDIX B.1 
The Threshold of Gini Coefficient 
The results of the comparative statics in Chapter 2 is 
a) If 
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Since the income difference between the rich and the poor is unobservable, 
we have to express the result in terms of Gini coefficient and the average 
wealth. 
Making the transition for the equation (3.7) gives 
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Then the solution of X is 
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No matter what the solution of X is, the process below shows that there is a 
unique threshold of the income inequality. 
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Since the X has two solutions, the comparative statics may have two opposite 
results in terms of income inequality. For example, one of the results is 
if 
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if 
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This solution indicts that the total borrowing, namely the size of capital markets, 
declines as the average income increases if income inequality is very low. On 
the contrary, if income inequality is higher than a critical value, financial 
development will benefit from an increase of average income. As a matter of 
fact, such situation would not happen in reality. Suppose there is a very poor 
economy with a small Gini coefficient. We assume that the Gini coefficient is 
lower than the threshold. It is very common at the initial stage of development 
in any economies. If some individuals benefit from economic development and 
become rich, the maximum wealthW

 increases. But the size of the capital 
market decreases on account of a small income inequality. It implies that the 
demand of credit decreases too. Hence there is no further development 
happen in the economy. Under the circumstances, no one can develop from a 
low income inequality situation. It is obviously ridiculous. 
 
Consequently the unique result of the comparative static can be rewritten as: 
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APPENDIX B.2 
The Size of Capital Markets--The Total Borrowing 
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APPENDIX B.3 
Table 3.4: Variable Description and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Financial 
Development 
(Private Capital)  
( ) ( 1)(0.5)*[ ]( ) ( 1)
( )
( )
e e
a
F t F t
P t P t
GDP t
P t
 
, where 
F is credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial 
institutions to the private 
sector. eP  is the end of period 
CPI and aP  is the average 
CPI for the year. 
Beck et al. (2009) 
Gini Coefficient The Gini Coefficient is the 
ratio of the area between the 
Lorenz curve, which is the 
proportion of population 
against the income share 
received, and the line of 
equality over the total area 
under the line of equality. It  
ranges from 0 to 1. A lower 
Gini coefficient presents a 
more equal environment while 
higher Gini coefficient 
indicates more inequalality. 
UNU-WIDER (2008) 
Real GDP per 
capita with lag 
Natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita with lag 
Alan Heston et al. 
(2009) 
Inflation Rate Log difference of Consumer 
Price Index 
International Financial 
Statistics 
Government 
Consumption 
Government Expenditure as a 
share of GDP. 
Bank (2009) 
Trade Openness  Sum of real exports and 
imports as a share of real 
GDP 
Bank (2009) 
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APPENDIX B.4 
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Private 
credit(%) 
Bank 
asset(%) 
Gini Real GDP per capita  Gov's con 
Trade 
openness 
Inflation rate 
Number of 
Observations 
256 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Mean 0.6418821 0.5949062 36.913 19854.66 16.77555 60.78473 34.40564 
Std. Dev. 0.454396 0. 352172 9.504511 10597.39 4.481837 25.30989 242.6211 
Minimum 0.069929 0. 1057385 23 2885.704 8.178534 15.76586 -1.166896 
Maximum 1.825699 1.640301 59.862 44240.27 32.17084 129.1988 3079.81 
Private credit 1       
Bank asset 0.7787 1      
Gini -0.4051 -0.4893 1     
Real GDP per 
capita 
0.7807 0.6415 -0.5396 1    
Gov's con -0.2931 -0.2334 -0.3412 -0.4032 1   
Trade openness -0.0799 0.1263 -0.0966 -0.0851 0.2401 1  
Inflation rate -0.1416 -0.1403 0.0875 -0.1297 0.0896 -0.1559 1 
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